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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Historically, the relationship between America and Europe has frequently been 
characterized by either conflicts or differences of opinion. The differences have been 
many, even though America was founded by Europeans. At the end of World War II , 
which claimed millions of lives, the world witnessed a new war which was did not 
claim as many lives, yet was even more terrifying; the Cold War. The world faced a 
more apocalyptic reality during this war; the possibility of global destruction as a result 
of the nuclear bomb. The two superpowers, who stood tall after the destruction of 
Europe, each claimed their right to lead the world. These were the U.S., with its system 
of capitalism and democracy, and the Soviet Union, with its Communism and 
dictatorship. This time the battleground was not physically in Europe, the two 
superpowers fought each other indirectly in other parts of the world. However, the 
importance of control over Europe was well understood by both parts. Each held on to 
their own region, the Americans in the West and the Russians in the East – dividing 
Europe into two different spheres of influence. 
Over the last years, and especially since the second war in Iraq started, the 
literature on the strains on the relationship between Europe and America has flourished. 
A term like “transatlantic drift”1 has been coined by Geir Lundestad to explain how the 
distance between the two has increased. Also, Niklos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras have 
released a collection of essays and documents which suggests how to deal with the 
transatlantic rift between Europe and America2. In addition, Svein Melbye writes about 
the basic differences which enhance the rift between the U.S. and the European Union.3 
Other scholars like Noam Chomsky4 and Francis Fukuyama5 understand and worry 
about the current state of transatlantic relations. The second Iraq war is one issue of 
                                                 
1
 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Europe after 1945: From ”Empire” by Invitation to 
Transatlantic Drift (Oxford University Press,  2003). 
2
 Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras, EU-US Relations: Repairing the Transatlantic Rift  (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2006). 
3
 Svein Melbye, Bush Revolusjonen i Amerikansk Utenrikspolitikk ( Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. 
Nygaard), 2004). 
4
 Noam Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post 9-11 World  (London: Henry Holt and 
Company, 2005). 
5
 Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons. America at the Crossroads  (London: Profile Books, 2006). 
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disagreement, but there are several other factors which all put pressure on the 
relationship. Europe and America seem to have moved further and further away from 
each other, even though their relationship is still characterized by interdependency. 
Reasons for the apparent change are many, and so are the different opinions and 
analyses of the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic community. 
This thesis concentrates on a specific aspect of the Euro-American relationship, 
namely American responses to European regionalism. Furthermore, the intent here is to 
perform a historical and theoretical analysis of two periods, the Cold War and the War 
on Terror. The goal is to find out if American responses have changed or remained 
mostly the same during these two periods.  
The analysis of American responses to European regionalism during the Cold 
War covers a large period of time, and limitations are necessary. This thesis shall 
therefore concentrate on the Cold War period from 1945 to the Reagan-Gorbachev 
summit in 1986 as the background context. Emphasis on the presidencies of John F. 
Kennedy, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan will be more in depth because responses 
in these periods were stronger than previous administrations. In addition, during these 
periods there are important events which highlight the issue of American responses 
towards European integration; Kennedy’s visit to Berlin, Nixon and the end of the 
Vietnam War, and Reagan and his hard-line policy towards the Soviet Union. However, 
the analysis section will be limited to only a part of the Cold War. The analysis section 
of this thesis focuses on the period from 1969 to 1977, which Geir Lundestad has 
labeled as “Conflict and Cooperation: American Western European Relations (not) 
Redefined.” The reason for this is that this was the period in which Europe started to 
appear more on its own, and will thus make a good object for analysis. Furthermore, this 
thesis analyzes American responses to European regionalism from 2001 up until the 
present, and compares this period to the selected time period of the Cold War.   
 
1. 2 Theories and Methods 
 
At the centre of this evaluation are a number of different theories. The idea is to 
define these theories, and weigh their relative usefulness in explaining evolving 
American responses to regionalism in Europe. The interesting part of this investigation 
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is to discover to what degree the theories apply to both the period of the Cold War and 
the War on Terror, or if they are less helpful or not suitable at all as explanatory models.  
Geir Lundestad’s theory of “empire by invitation” is central in explaining the 
relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe during the Cold War. This theory 
shows how Europe welcomed American leadership for protection against Communism 
and aid in rebuilding its national economies. Even though it is clear that Lundestad’s 
theory is well renowned and respected, it will be tested critically. Furthermore, “empire 
by invitation” will be applied to the period of the War on Terror, and the goal in this 
section is to establish whether the theory also can explain American responses to 
European regionalism in this period. Furthermore, Geir Lundestad’s book “The United 
States and Europe after 1945: From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift” shall 
provide the historical background for this thesis.  
Another important theory is Bjørn Hettne’s theory of “The new regionalism”, 
which explains how the European regionalist project developed over time. This theory 
is useful in describing how Europe evolves from a divided continent of individual states 
into the supranational European Union. “The new regionalism” will be applied to both 
the Cold War period and the War on Terror period, and tested critically.  
The notion of “defensive realism” as described by Robert Jervis, and to a certain 
extent as presented by Farheed Zakaria in his critique of the theory, is useful when 
analyzing American foreign policy toward Europe during the Cold War. The idea of 
“defensive realism” is that states expand due to insecurity, and it is this notion together 
with the security dilemma that will be the basis for the analysis of the Cold War and the 
War on Terror periods. Both these periods have a similar scenario where the U.S. 
confronts an enemy and its foreign policy is strongly reflected by this. In addition, the 
American need for security has had and still has an effect on its relationship to Europe, 
more particularly European integration.  
This thesis supplements “defensive realism” by using Fareed Zakaria’s theory of 
“State-centered Realism” in order to explain American foreign policy towards Europe. 
Zakaria’s theory emphasizes how states expand their interest abroad when experiencing 
an increase in state power. The relevance of this theory will be tested first on the period 
of the Cold War, where the U.S. emerged as strengthened and became the first 
superpower after World War II. In this context, the U.S. expanded its influence in 
Europe when its power was at a peak. America’s role as the only superpower in the 
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world after the end of the Cold War will be the main focus during the analysis of the 
War on Terror period.  
Finally, the notion of “cultural hegemony” as described by Antonio Gramsci will 
serve as an explanation of the extent of American ideology’s influence on Europe. 
Especially during the Cold War the impact of American culture and capitalist system 
was substantial, and “cultural hegemony” will be tested to see how well this notion 
explains the historical events and the relationship between Europe and the U.S. The 
period of the War on Terror will also be subject for analysis, and the goal in this section 
is to establish how well Gramsci’s notion applies to American culture’s dominance in 
Europe today.  
 
1.3 The Cold War and European Regionalism 
 
In the course of further development of international revolution there will 
emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself 
the countries which tend towards socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to 
itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two 
centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of 
communism in the entire world.6 
 
The American interest in Europe after World War II was increased due to the 
fear of Communism, and the U.S. promoted regionalism here in order to prevent the 
Soviet Union from gaining influence in Europe. Furthermore, Western Europe 
welcomed American leadership as it was in need of aid to rebuild its national 
economies. At the same time, it needed protection and security guarantees from the 
danger of an emerging Communist threat. American and West-European interests 
coincided in all areas at first, and this was an important reason why the U.S. supported 
and promoted regionalism in this area. However, the Soviet Union had control over 
Eastern Europe and thus Europe was divided into western and eastern blocks. The 
division of Europe into two spheres of influence, each dominated by the two 
superpowers, remained during the whole period of the Cold War. 
                                                 
6
 George Kennan, “Long Telegram,” (Truman Presidential Library and Museum, Harry S. Truman 
Administration File, Elsey Papers, February 22, 1946), 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/index.php?pagenumber=
2&documentid=6-6&documentdate=1946-02-22&studycollectionid=coldwar&groupid=  (accessed April 
2, 2007). 
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After the Cold War, the European regionalist project grew into a more 
independent power bloc, which turned out to be different than what the U.S. had 
anticipated. America’s plan for an integrated Europe involved a strong regional actor 
capable of holding its own defense and saving U.S. tax dollars, and contributing to the 
security of the U.S. Furthermore, the integrated Europe was expected to always be on 
America’s side, and it is here one can see a root of conflict. A stronger, united Europe 
that disagreed with the U.S. did not, and most likely does not, sit well with Washington. 
However, this development of a stronger Europe on the international arena occurred 
mostly on an economical level. Europe has not yet developed a common foreign policy 
or a single European army. In that context it is not a superpower militarily. Even so, 
America did not seem to have reaped what it thought it had sown when it first 
encouraged regionalism after World War II. A Europe which became more independent 
and self-sufficient could not be influenced or pressured as easily as before.  
The U.S. had expectations and goals, many which were obtained during the early 
years of the Cold War. These goals were to limit Soviet expansion, fitting Western 
Europe into an Atlantic framework and the rearmament of West Germany. In addition, 
America’s overriding goal was to keep Communists in Western Europe out of power. 
On the cultural side, The United States wanted Western Europe to be open for American 
culture, as well as the rest of the world.   However, as Western-Europe and later the 
European Union, grew more and more into something akin to region-state on the 
economic level, America found that it did not possess the authority and power that it 
once had towards Europe. Nor did it have the support or willingness of Europe to 
cooperate solely on American terms anymore. 
 
1.4 The War on Terror 
 
This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of 
defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of 
countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and 
contribute in different ways. Some will provide diplomatic support, others 
financial, still others logistical or military. Some will help us publicly, while 
others, because of their circumstances, may help us privately and secretly. In this 
war, the mission will define the coalition — not the other way around.7 
                                                 
7
 Donald Rumsfeld, “A New Kind Of War,” (U.S. Department of Defense,  The New York Times, 
September 27, 2001), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=440 (accessed April 2, 
2007). 
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After the terrorist attacks on America in 2001, the idea of a form of American 
hegemony became more important than ever, and even the notion of an American 
empire was used instead of hegemony. Richard A. Falk published “The Declining 
World Order. America’s Imperial Geopolitics” in 2004 and in this book he criticizes, 
amongst other things, the foreign policy of the Bush administration after 9/11. He 
argued that the Bush administration had plans of global domination and that America 
was establishing itself as an empire by military might.8 This emphasis on America as a 
hegemon resurfaced mainly due to how the administration of George W. Bush 
announced and conducted the War on Terror in the first years after 9/11.  
How does the idea of American hegemony fit in with the reality of a growing 
European regionalism? And how has the war on terror affected the relationship between 
the two sides of the Atlantic? Some argue that the EU can now be seen as a “threat” to 
American unilateralism and global domination. Seeing the world through a realist lens, 
can the EU in the future fill the role as a superpower and a counterweight to the U.S., 
and in this context, what are the American responses to this hypothetic reality? By 
“realist” this thesis uses the classic term as described by Hans J. Morgenthau, where 
states seek power and security in the international system9. Even so, the differences 
between America and Europe are not as comprehensive as they were between the two 
superpowers during the Cold War. Is a relationship characterized by power struggle 
really a realistic scenario? These are not two sworn enemies with different ideologies 
fighting for influence in the world. However, the question is whether the U.S. sees the 
EU as an ally and partner, or as a competitor. America is now realizing that the War on 
Terror cannot be won without allies, which might perhaps contribute to an improvement 
in the relationship between the two. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Richard A. Falk, The Declining World Order. America’s Imperial Geopolitics  (New York: Routledge. 
2004). 
9
 Hans J., Morgenthau,  “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,” Fifth Edition, 
Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15), 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm (accessed February 22, 2007). 
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1.5 A Comparison 
 
It is interesting to compare the American response to regionalism during these 
two periods, because it shows how global threats can have an effect on America’s 
relationships with others. This thesis suggests that these two periods are well suited for 
explaining American responses to European regionalism due to their similarities. 
During the Cold War the relationship between America and Europe was characterized 
by a form of mutual dependency and fear of a common enemy. Europe needed the U.S. 
for protection from financial ruin and as a security guarantee. The U.S. needed Europe 
to achieve its main goal, which was a deterrent to the Soviet Union. According to Geir 
Lundestad it is clear that even though the U.S. possessed greater economic and military 
power, Europe did have leverage towards America. Centrist governments were 
promoted by the U.S. in Europe, and these possessed leverage in the sense that America 
found the alternatives to be disagreeable. The American desire to make Europe more 
integrated as a deterrent against Soviet expansion, led to the U.S. sacrificing some of its 
interests in order to achieve a greater goal. For example, economic interests had to pay 
the price for the integration of Europe, something which was widely debated, especially 
in the private sector in the U.S. Since European integration was the overall goal, 
sacrifices had to be made. This was particularly clear in the area of agriculture where 
European protectionism would damage American export, but the U.S. postponed 
addressing the matter in order for the further economic integration of Europe to 
continue. A more thorough discussion of this will be included in chapter three of this 
thesis.  
There must not be any doubts however, that Europe was much weaker than the 
U.S. and in desperate need of all forms of aid during the early years of the Cold War. 
No kind of leverage could change this fact. Still, the key element in the Cold War for 
this thesis was the strong American desire for European regionalism. In providing a 
deterrent against Communism, European integration was clearly instrumental. This was 
essential for American security, and the system of capitalism. Furthermore, as Europe 
would be able to support its own military defense, American tax dollars would be saved. 
After all, American military presence in Europe did not come cheap. Despite 
disagreements over agriculture, the U.S. knew that a growing European market would 
be in the interest of America in the future. Strong support from the U.S. together with 
internal initiatives in Europe made integration possible.  
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The American response to regionalism during the War on Terror tends to be 
different from the Cold War period, as is the relationship between Europe and America, 
and the balance of power in the world. The EU has evolved into something resembling a 
superpower itself, even though its military integration is poorly developed. However, its 
economic and political power is indisputably considerable. It has evolved into one of the 
major actors on the world arena, but more as a soft power than a hard power. The EU 
can be said to have a stronger power of attraction than the U.S. has. Its success in 
integrating and expanding makes it a model for others to follow. A definition of a 
superpower in this thesis is an actor which has at its disposal instruments which other 
powers do not have. The EU possesses the ability to combine soft and hard power in a 
successful manner, making it a “Metrosexual Superpower.”10  
It may seem easy to draw a parallel to the Cold War in describing the two sides 
of the Atlantic (and the rest of the world) as facing a common enemy. One of several 
significant differences in the present situation lies in the fact that the integrated Europe 
is now more of an equal than a cluster of allies in desperate need of aid. It is capable of 
disagreeing more strongly and will not be pushed as easily as before. In a post-Cold 
War world, the EU prefers to work through diplomacy instead of war, and this is one 
issue of disagreement between Europe and the U.S. Clearly, its initial positive response 
to European integration must have been affected by the reactions following the Iraq 
War, amongst other things. Does a fully integrated Europe serve American interests 
best, or is it better with a division of Europe? Former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s comments on “Old Europe and New Europe” certainly makes us think that 
American responses to European integration really have changed. And the EU is 
definitely divided in giving the U.S. its support, as was shown by the reactions to the 
war in Iraq. 
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
 
This chapter outlines the content of this thesis, and specifies the goals for the 
analysis of the American response to European regionalism. 
                                                 
10
 Paragh Khanna, “The Metrosexual Superpower,” Foreign Policy 16 (August 2004), Yale Global 
Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4366 (accessed February 24, 2007). 
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Chapter 2 introduces the theories which are much of the basis for the analysis in 
this thesis. The first of these is regionalism as presented by Bjørn Hettne and Richard A. 
Falk. Following this is Geir Lundestads’ theory of “Empire by Invitation” which 
provides the central perspective of the thesis on the historical background. Robert 
Jervis’ theory of defensive realism and Farheed Zakaria’s theory of state-centered 
realism are central parts in explaining American foreign policy. Finally, the theory of 
hegemony, as originally presented by Antonio Gramsci, forms the basis for the debate 
concerning American hegemony’s relevance to European-American relations in the two 
periods examined in the thesis.  
Chapter 3 discusses the central aspect of the relationship between the U.S. and 
Europe during the period of 1969 to 1977 of the Cold War that is examined in the thesis, 
America’s strong interest in the European regionalist project. Was this positive attitude 
towards European integration born from a moral and sympathetic view of helping 
Europe get back on its feet? Was it just meant to serve America’s own interest both 
economically and militarily, or did it result from a combination of these and other 
factors? After inviting the Americans in for protection against Communism, Europe 
developed into a significant power bloc itself which later moved further away from total 
American control. Did the Americans foresee this change, and what was their response 
to the changing reality? This part of the thesis focuses primarily on a preliminary 
evaluation of existing theoretical interpretations of this aspect of Euro-American 
relations, rather than the historical processes and events involved in America’s response 
to regional integration in Europe. How and how well the existent theories explain the 
events is therefore the basis of this part of the thesis. Furthermore, one section of this 
chapter deals with how the different presidential administrations responded to 
regionalism in Europe during the period of 1945 to 1985. The intent of this short 
overview is to establish if there are patterns to be found in American responses during 
this period, and in that context some administrations shall be covered more in depth 
than others. Finally, the role of NATO during the Cold War is discussed. Firstly, the 
intent is to examine the importance of the organizations as a means of containing 
Communism. Secondly, this thesis considers to what degree NATO has functioned as 
the glue which has held America and Europe together.  
Chapter 4 discusses how the U.S. responded after 9/11, which led to the War on 
Terror, and how these events affected U.S.-European relations. It also discusses the 
impact of the war in Afghanistan with emphasis on how the U.S. has been supported by 
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Europe in its war against the Taliban regime. The angle in this chapter is focused on 
how the War in Iraq further deepened the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic, as 
European opposition grew strong against American unilateralism in its policy toward 
Iraq. Furthermore, this chapter discusses and analyzes political, and to a certain extent, 
historical differences between America and Europe, and to what extent these have 
demonstrably affected US responses to continuing European integration. Does the U.S. 
feel that the European Union has played out its role and performed its purpose? Is 
European opposition to American unilateralism viewed by important policymakers as a 
hindrance to U.S. plans? Or does it still perform a useful role? American relations with 
the former Soviet states of Eastern Europe seem to show that there is a certain degree of 
loyalty to the U.S. there. Considering the experiences of these states during the Cold 
War, it is not hard to see why maintaining a good relationship with America is 
important to them. Could this be dividing Europe, and in that context will division in 
Europe be in America’s interests? An important part of this chapter is the role of NATO 
since 9/11 compared to its role during the Cold War. From being the glue which held 
Europe and America together, it may be argued that the organization has been 
transformed into an instrument for the execution of American policy. Finally, this 
chapter establishes whether the theories from chapter two also apply to U.S. responses 
to regionalism during the current war on terror. 
Chapter 5 draws conclusions based on the previous chapters and determines 
whether there are patterns or changes when looking at American responses to European 
regionalism during the two periods.  
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Chapter 2: Theories 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The basis for this chapter is a set of theories and notions, which will try to 
explain the dimensions of the relationship between Europe and America during the Cold 
War, and more importantly, the American response to European integration in this 
period. The goal is to establish whether these theories are able to explain the historical 
events and the actions taken by the U.S. regarding regionalism in Europe in a time 
where bipolarity was at its peak. This chapter starts by defining the theories, while the 
discussion concerning their relevance and explanatory power continues in chapter 3.  
Geir Lundestad is one of Norway’s leading historians and his works on the 
relationship between Europe and the America are deeply renowned. His theory of 
“Empire by Invitation”, which he began in the 1908s is frequently cited by other 
scholars. The core concept of this theory is how Western Europe invited the U.S. into 
Europe to take leadership and provide economic assistance as well as military protection 
from the Soviet Union. 
Bjørn Hettne is a professor at the Peace and Development Research Institute at 
Gothenburg University in Sweden. His theory, “The New Regionalism”, explains how 
regionalism develops from within 
Robert Jervis is a professor at Columbia University and known for his work 
concerning international relations. His notions of “Defensive Realism” argue how states 
expand to increase and maintain their own security. This thesis shall test how these 
notions can help to explain American responses towards regionalism in Europe during 
the Cold War and the War on Terror. 
Fareed Zakaria is specializing in foreign affairs and international relations. His 
theory of “State-centered Realism” argues how states expand when they experience an 
increase in their power. This theory shall be applied to how the U.S. responded to 
regionalism in Europe during the Cold War and the War on Terror. 
Antonio Gramsci was an Italian political theorist who is seen as one of the 
original Marxist thinkers. His work concentrates on analysis of culture and political 
leadership. This thesis shall use his thoughts of “Cultural Hegemony”, and establish 
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whether these can provide a better understanding of America’s influence on Europe, 
both during the Cold War and the War on Terror. 
 
2.2 Geir Lundestad: “Empire” by Invitation 1945-50  
 
After World War II, Europe was in ruins, and the power the states in this region 
once possessed had been reduced to almost nothing. In order to build up their countries 
and economies, the nations of Europe were in great need of help from the outside. In 
addition, there were other dangers, such as the one posed by the Soviet Union. Europe, 
in its current state, could not offer any resistance to the emerging Communist threat 
from the East. The answer to all these problems was to be found in assistance from 
America. 
According to Lundestad, the Americans were invited into Europe with the sole 
purpose of helping Europe get back on its feet and to offer protection from the Russians. 
At this time, many were afraid that the U.S. would return to its isolationist policy from 
the interwar years. The British government was particularly occupied with creating 
bonds between America and Europe. Furthermore, at the economical level, all countries 
agreed on the necessity of American assistance. These nations were actively 
encouraging a bigger role for the U.S. in European politics, and with this came 
increased influence for the U.S. The nations of Western Europe invited the U.S. to 
Europe, and the Americans accepted the invitation. This was mostly because the U.S. 
supported the policies which these nations’ governments stood for. However, the aid 
was not given without terms; Europe had to give something back. The trade inside the 
region had to be liberalized, the contact with Eastern Europe had to be limited, and the 
U.S. demanded a certain degree of influence on some of the countries’ economic 
policies.  
The relationship between America and Europe changed over time. More 
specifically, when the aid from the U.S. was certain, and nations had secured help, they 
started to criticize elements of American policy which did not appeal to Europe. Even 
so, during the first years after the war, the interests of both parties coincided with each 
other. The U.S. was the only nation capable of helping the reconstruction of Europe, and 
the only one which could provide a counterweight to the Soviet Union. In the same way, 
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the U.S. knew that it would obtain economic advantages from helping, and at the same 
time make sure that the Russians were contained.11 
Lundestad argues how both Britain and France had been practically ruined by 
the war when he explains the economic and political sides of “empire” by invitation. 
When offering economic assistance to European states, the American government also 
implied that governments free from any elements of Communism would be met with a 
more positive response than those which were “infected” with too much Socialism. As a 
result, the U.S. gave more to states which were politically compatible with its views and 
values, and those that were not were either blocked or received much smaller amounts. 
 In addition to skepticism towards the far left, the U.S. was not too fond of the far right 
either. America promoted more centrist governments, and this actually gave Europeans 
leverage since the U.S. strongly disapproved of the alternatives. “The weaker they were, 
the more leverage they sometimes had”.12 There is no doubt that the Europeans were 
very interested in the involvement of the United States in European affairs. In analyzing 
the military side of “empire” by invitation, Lundestad claims that most of the initiatives 
which led to the forming of NATO, came from Europe and not the U.S. “In the 
negotiations to set up NATO, virtually every European country wanted to make the 
American military commitment to Europe as automatic as possible.”13 Just as Europe 
wanted the Americans to be involved in economic affairs, this kind of commitment was 
also encouraged in military affairs. With the growing American commitment to NATO, 
there was a lesser willingness from Europe to do its part, and this was not in accordance 
with the American objective of making Europe increase its own defense efforts.14 
There were several motives for the American support of European integration 
according to Lundestad. He labels the first one as “The American Model”, and this was 
the idea of American universalism. Many senators together with people in high position 
believed that Europe would benefit from adopting the American model and develop in 
the same way as the thirteen colonies had done in the past. In other words; the United 
States of Europe. A second motive was “A More Efficient Europe,” with 
“…Washington’s emphasis on an integrated Europe being a more rational and efficient 
Europe.”15 There is no doubt that the economic benefits of this were striking, but there 
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would also be benefits politically as it would be easier for the U.S. to deal with one, 
united Western Europe. “A Reduced American Burden” meant that European 
integration would reduce American expenses. After all, the U.S. did not intend to pay 
for European security forever. It would be unwise to neglect the motive of “Containing 
the Soviet Union”. Washington’s faith in European integration as containment remained 
strong for more than forty years. Another aspect of this was there was a hope that a 
powerful united Western Europe would attract all Soviet satellite states in the East. 
Finally, Lundestad labels the last motive for European Integration as “Containment of 
Germany”. According to him, the fear of a united, powerful Germany arising was 
substantial among the Western powers, not just the U.S. To prevent an independent 
Germany from establishing ties with the Soviet Union, it was necessary to keep 
Germany divided and make sure that Western Germany formed the backbone of 
European integration together with France. This again meant actual “dual containment,” 
in trying to control Germany and prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence.16 
 
2.3 An Introduction to Regionalism 
 
Bjørn Hettne explains a region by referring to three models. The first one is “a 
trading bloc or mega market which is a result from a breakup of the free trading 
regime.”17 The second one is “the geo-political division of the world into competing or 
aligned military-political power blocs.”18 The third model and the one Hettne is calling 
the “New regionalism,” is “a process of regionalization from below which is a result 
from internal transformations within emerging regions.”19 This “New Regionalism” 
differs from the old one in three important respects. The first one is that the “New 
Regionalism” is taking form in a multipolar world instead of a bipolar world. Secondly, 
is that this regionalism is created from within rather than from above as the old 
regionalism was. Thirdly, “the new regionalism is a more comprehensive, 
multidimensional process with less regard to objectives.”20 This applies to the 
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development of the European Union, as it has over the years evolved by initiatives from 
within. In addition, the European Union is multipolar since it consists of many different 
countries where no one is above the others. 
A distinction between normative and positive understanding of regionalism is 
also necessary according to Hettne. The normative meaning of regionalism is regional 
integration seen as a political project. The European Union is a political as well as an 
economic project, and therefore fits well into this distinction. In addition, there is a 
difference between hegemonic regionalism, which is created by pressure from a 
hegemonic power and autonomous regionalism, which is regionalism from below.21 
Hegemonic regionalism does not apply to the European Union, but can be used when 
describing America’s interest in connecting the countries of Latin America. 
It is important for Hettne to distinguish between levels of regionness, which is 
regional complexity, when talking about regions’ capacity as actors. There are five 
levels of regionness. The first is region as “a geographical and ecological unit, delimited 
by natural barriers.”22 The second level is “region as a social system, something which 
implies translocal relations of social, political, cultural and economic nature between 
human groups.”23 The important thing here is that they constitute some form of regional 
complex. The third level is “region as organized cooperation in any of the cultural, 
economic or military fields.”24 Here, region is defined by membership of the regional 
organization in question. The fourth level is “region as regional civil society, which 
takes shape when the organizational framework promotes social communication and 
convergence of values throughout the region.”25 A key element at this level is the 
multidimensional quality of regional cooperation. The last level of regionness is “region 
as acting subject with a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of 
decision-making.”26 Important areas here are conflict resolution and welfare. This level 
is emphasized in this thesis since the European Union is an example of this degree of 
regionness. “The ultimate outcome of this level of regionalism could be a “region-
state,” which in terms of scope can be compared to the classical empires, but in terms of 
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political order constitutes a voluntary evolution of sovereign national political units into 
a supranatural community to which certain functions are transferred.”27  
The European Union serves as the best example of regionalism we have, and 
many believe it will function as an example for the rest of the world to follow in 
establishing a world order of “region-states.” An interesting debate would be how the 
U.S. would respond to this kind of world wide regionalism. Would America support 
these regionalist projects, or resist since they could, and most likely, would represent a 
threat to American power and dominance? 
Hettne explains the different dimensions of regionalization: “The process of 
regionalization implies a change from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity 
and in this context it important to note different dimensions of regionalization.”28 These 
are culture, security, economic policies and political regime. Important for this thesis 
are security and economic policies. Security is a crucial dimension, and the divisions of 
security also mean the divisions of economy. This was very clearly shown in the pattern 
of regional economic cooperation in Europe during the Cold War. “A common security 
order is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, precondition for regional integration. Of equal 
importance is the compatibility of economic policies.”29 Both of these dimensions were 
crucial for the relationship between Europe and American during the Cold War. 
 
2.4 Robert Jervis: Defensive Realism   
 
Roberts Jervis is arguing for defensive realism. He claims that this theory has 
more in common with neo-liberals in taking a position on the role of unnecessary 
conflict, where the prisoner’s dilemma analogy is important. A state which increases its 
own security can have negative effects on another state’s security. Furthermore, he 
continues by explaining how defensive realists are more pessimistic than neo-liberals. 
First of all, defensive realists believe that conflict is only necessary where there are 
aggressor states. Secondly, he argues that it can sometimes be hard for states to establish 
which situation they are in. For example, one state can mistake another for being 
aggressive when it is simply seeking security. Finally, defensive realists are not so 
confident in the actors’ abilities to achieve common interests or goals.  
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Jervis claims that defensive realists fall between offensive realists and neo-
liberals, and that in this view the actions of a state depends on whether it faces a 
likeminded partner or an aggressive, expansionist state. When discussing the changes 
needed for cooperation and reducing the danger of conflict, Jervis argues the following: 
 
Thus for defensive realists, diagnosis of the situation and the other’s objectives 
is a critical and difficult step, which explains why analysts of this type come to 
different policy prescriptions if they have different views of the adversary.30  
 
It all depends on the nature of the situation, whether the actors in focus are 
characterized as status quo powers or expansionist powers facing each other. 
Jervis also claims that “many conflicts can be seen as both an avoidable security 
dilemma and the product of irreconcilable differences.31  
 
He also notes that this aspect of defensive realism can be applied to the 
relationship between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Both 
superpowers sought security for themselves, and their differences were so 
comprehensive in that each “believed that the other would be a menace as long as its 
domestic system was in place.”32 Jervis’ and his thoughts about defensive realism are 
indeed worth examining in this context.33  Defensive realists’ emphasis on the security 
dilemma and the intentions of the actors are both useful in order to explain American 
responses towards European integration, as this describes the situation between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  
 
2.5 Fareed Zakaria: State-centered Realism 
 
“Nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-
makers perceive a relative increase in state power.”34 It is statesmen who confront the 
international system, not nations, and they have access to only a small part of the 
national power of which the state apparatus can extract for itself. State power is 
important to statesmen, not the capabilities of the nation. Furthermore, this is the ability 
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of the state to extract power for its own ends. Statesmen will therefore expand the 
nation’s political interests in other countries when they find an increase in state power, 
not national power.  
According to Zakaria, state-centered realism is more sophisticated than classical 
realism when regarding the measurement of power. It tries to bring the state back into 
realism, and it limits itself in concentrating only on foreign policy, and does not include 
domestic policy. Zakaria argues that “state power is a function of national power and 
state strength,”35 and this means that the stronger the state is, the more capable it is to 
use national power for its ends. This must however be measured along several axes, and 
these are state scope and a state’s central policy-making apparatus. How broadly a state 
defines its responsibilities, as well how strong capabilities and cohesion a state has to 
carry out its intentions, are important issues in this context.36  
The main idea behind this theory is that when a state becomes more powerful, it 
will expand in order to maximize its influence and be able to control its international 
environment.37 “In sum, this theory argues that a state’s capabilities shape its intentions: 
it will expand when it can.”38 
 
2.6 Hegemony Theory 
 
World-system theorists explain hegemony as something more than just 
leadership, but also less than an empire. A more narrow definition states that the 
principal function of the hegemon in the twentieth century was to provide an 
international commercial and financial system based on liberal values.39 After 1945, 
some have claimed that the U.S. is a hegemon. The theory of hegemony implies that the 
hegemon is above others, but does not obtain control by use of force. Its way of 
dominating is rather by encouraging others to adapt its norms in a process of 
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socialization.40 The original theorist in the area of hegemony was Italian writer Antonio 
Gramsci, and the concept of ruling by means of culture domination instead of coercion 
or political domination, is the core of his hegemony theory.  
 
Gramsci (1971) began with the insight that, most of the time, political power in 
liberal democracies is exercised not through government use of force 
(imprisoning political dissenters, killing protestors, etc.), but through a dominant 
world-view, or ideology. This commonly-held set of ideas and symbols 
legitimates existing rulers, helping them to win the citizens' consent, or at least 
acquiescence.41   
 
Gramsci’s translated writings contain no precise definition of cultural 
hegemony. What comes closest is his often quoted characterization of hegemony 
as “the spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this 
consent is historically caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which 
the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of 
production.42 
 
A large part of this concept can be applied to the way in which America 
influenced Europe during the Cold War by offering economic aid and protection against 
Communism. The American notion of liberalism was carried onto Europe and adopted 
there, both economically and politically. Even though Europe was not that different 
from America in terms of culture, it still had to adapt to and embrace American values 
as “payment” for assistance. 
Furthermore, in “Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci,” 
Gramsci writes about “economism” and hegemony:  
 
Undoubtedly, the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the 
interest and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be 
exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in 
                                                 
40
 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945  (London\New York: Routledge, 
2001), 65. 
41
 Dr. Chad Raphael, “Theory of Hegemony and Ideology”, Santa Clara University, 
http://codesign.scu.edu/chad/120/heg.html  (accessed January 26, 2007). 
42
 T. J. Jackson Lears, “The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,” The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 90, no. 3. (June 1985), p. 568,  
http://www.jstor.org/view/00028762/di951441/95p00056/0?currentResult=00028762%2bdi951441%2b9
5p00056%2b0%2cFFFFFF0B&searchUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fsearch%2FBasicResults
%3Fhp%3D25%26si%3D1%26Query%3Dcultural%2Bhegemony (accessed January 26, 2007). 
 
 
 
 23 
other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-
corporate kind.43  
 
This can be applied to how the U.S. sacrificed certain economic interest when 
promoting European integration during the Cold War. This was as, mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, necessary in order to achieve the overall goal which was to integrate 
Europe as a mean to fight Communism.  
In their article Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order, 
Thomas J. Volgy and Lawrence E. Imalle, argue that hegemony was also a structural 
feature of the Cold War in addition to bipolarity. These authors draw their conclusion 
on the traditions set by Gilpin, Thompson and Levi, which states “the world order of the 
recent past can be viewed as a function of strong leadership or hegemony exercised by a 
single powerful state.”44 They continue by emphasizing that during a period of 
hegemony, one single actor emerges and has the capability of providing strong 
leadership in establishing the rules of the system, and in addition has economic and 
military capabilities which are strong enough to pose deterrence against other actors that 
could disrupt hegemonic leadership and the stability of the system.45 According to the 
authors “hegemony occurs when a single central actor has the capability and willingness 
to lead the system and to create order and predictability in global politics.”46 Clearly, 
this suits well to explain the position of the U.S. after the Second World War and to 
some extent during most of the period of the Cold War.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has defined the theories which are used in this thesis. The next 
chapter performs an analysis of these theories, and tries to determine whether they can 
explain the historical events and political actions taken by the United States during the 
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period of the Cold War. Chapter four makes, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
an analysis of the theories’ explanatory power during the period of the War on Terror. 
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Chapter 3: The Cold War 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with a central aspect of the relationship between the U.S. and 
Europe during the Cold War, namely America’s strong interest in a European 
regionalist project. Was this positive attitude towards European integration born from a 
moral and sympathetic view of helping Europe get back on its feet, was it just meant to 
serve America’s own interest both economically and militarily, or was it a result from a 
combination of these and other factors?  
After inviting the Americans in for protection against Communism and help to 
rebuild itself, Europe developed into a significant power bloc itself which later started to 
move away from American control. Did the Americans foresee this change, and what 
was their response to the changing reality? Seemingly, the U.S. officially supported 
European integration all the way even though emphasis on US-Europe relations varied 
over the years. Fighting Communism in other parts of the world moved America’s 
attention away from Europe as the Cold War progressed. Nevertheless, the notion that 
integration served the interests of both sides of the Atlantic always remained. 
The main part of this chapter is an analysis of how well the theories from chapter 
2 can explain events and actions taken by the U.S. concerning European integration. 
This analysis however, will be limited to the period from 1967 to 1977 due to the 
complexity and the length of the period of the Cold War. The reason for choosing this 
particular period is that during these years Europe started to emerge more on its own 
making this an interesting subject for analysis. In addition, during these years the U.S. 
had been weakened by the Vietnam War and thus tried to establish “special 
relationships” with Britain and France in order to gain more control over the 
development in Europe.  
Furthermore, one section of this chapter deals with how the different 
administrations responded to regionalism in Europe during the period from 1945 to 
1989. The intent of this short overview is to establish if there are patterns to be found in 
how presidents and their administrations responded to regionalism in Europe. Some 
administrations are covered more thoroughly than others in order to show the patterns 
more clearly. These are the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Reagan administrations.  
 26 
A discussion of the role of NATO during the Cold War is also an important part 
of this chapter. The organization served first and foremost as a mean of containing 
Communism, but it also represented the glue which held America and Europe together. 
Finally, a conclusion sums up the analysis of each theory 
 
3.2 Applying the Theories 
3.2.1 “Empire by Invitation” 
Lundestad’s theory of how Europeans accepted and welcomed American 
leadership at first can hardly be doubted. A Europe in crisis had no other option it if 
were to ensure its own survival. Also important were the close ties the region had with 
America after massive emigration from Europe to the U.S.: and the Allied together 
during the World Wars I and II. Seemingly, there was not much anti-Americanism at 
this point. However, Lundestad’s emphasis on “empire,” even if he is speaking of a 
limited “empire,” does not get attention in this thesis. Rather, the issue here is regarding 
the U.S. as a hegemon as explained in the section concerning hegemony theory. 
Lundestad defends his use of “empire” by referring to Zbigniew Brezezinski who 
explains “empire” as: “morally neutral to describe a hierarchical system of political 
relationships, radiating from a center.”47  James McAllister argues that: “His definition 
of “empire” is less than clear and many scholars will question exactly how much this 
“empire” differs from what other scholars have described as an American hegemony or 
sphere of influence.”48 As a result, this chapter chooses to use the concept of hegemony 
when analyzing American responses. When discussing America as an empire, one can 
wonder why the U.S. pushed so hard for European integration and European 
sovereignty, since this would be a future challenge for the world’s most powerful 
state.49 An empire would surely not do such a thing? Lundestad admits that the U.S. 
willingly sacrificed control in exchange for achieving other important goals, but this 
thesis still argues that the label of “empire” should be replaced with “hegemon.”  
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America had the military and economic power to help Europe, but also to set the 
rules for this region. It seemed that help always came with certain requirements, as the 
U.S. had plans of restructuring Europe. According to Lundestad, the relationship turned 
sour when Europe started to feel secure enough to state its own interests again. He 
argues that in the period between 1969 and 1977, “…..Europe was striking out more on 
its own.”50 Both France and Germany were in these years developing their own policies 
to deal with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Another factor which strengthened 
Europe was the membership of Britain in the European Community. In addition, there 
was a rise of democracy in Southern Europe. The U.S. under Nixon had redefined itself 
in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. The administration acknowledged the decline of 
the U.S. and now sought to cooperate with other major economic centers in the World. 
However, even though Europe wanted to appear more as an independent actor, the 
invitations to the U.S. still continued. According to Lundestad, the military dependency 
on American endured and it was of utter most importance to keep American soldiers in 
Western Europe. In addition, he argues that Western Europe did no want to become an 
equal to the U.S. at all neither did it expect to be. Even so, the tensions were many, and 
they were more of a structural kind than before. The objects of disagreement were no 
longer single issues but touched basic relationships instead.51  
However, despite all the tensions that arose, American presence in Europe was 
still encouraged and practically demanded by Europeans. They were not that secure yet. 
Some scholars disagree with his claim that containing Germany was a more important 
factor behind European integration than containing the Soviet Union, but this thesis 
argues that this emphasis is important. The fear of Germany rising once again was 
indeed very clear in the early years after the war (this fear actually remained for several 
decades), and it seems probable that dual containment functioned as a strong incentive 
for European integration both by America and the nations of Western Europe. As 
McAllister argues:  
 
While America’s support for European integration was rooted in many different 
factors, Lundestad correctly emphasizes that the critical factor driving 
Washington’s policies was the need to resolve the classical German problem in a 
way that both the Germans and the Western Europeans could voluntarily accept.52 
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Solving the German problem was a prerequisite for European integration, and 
thus in the interest of both the U.S. and the nations of Europe. In addition, European 
integration was a way of removing the threat of a united Germany rising once again as 
an enemy. 
 
3.2.2 “The New Regionalism” 
Regionalism, or more specifically Bjørn Hettne’s concept of “new regionalism,” is 
very useful in order to explain how the European Union has evolved over the years. In 
the early years after World War II one could talk about the U.S. as a hegemon presiding 
over Europe. The economic and military aspects of this form of hegemony will be 
covered in the section dealing with hegemony theory. Hettne’s emphasis on how Europe 
began to evolve from within is what makes his theory important for the argument of this 
thesis. The motivation behind European integration changed from being encouraged 
from the outside (from the U.S.), he claims, to initiatives which started to come from 
within. The process acquired a life of its own, and integration moved in a direction 
which served the interests of European nations instead of those of U.S. However, this 
thesis is limited to a specific period of the Cold War, and will not proceed into the 
matter of the reunification of Germany and how this effected European integration and 
the strengthening of this region.  
As previously mentioned, during the period from 1969 to 1977, Europe started to 
strike out more on its own. The integration process was strengthened by the admission 
of new members in 1973. Britain was one of them, and this contributed strongly to 
strengthening regionalism in Western Europe. It interesting to note what Geir Lundestad 
wrote about Great Britain in this context: “The paradox was now, when the United 
States finally took a strong interest in the ‘special relationship’, Britain was not really 
interested.”53 Britain under Prime Minister Heath was at this time more interested in 
British membership in the European Community. The relationship between the Nixon-
Kissinger administration and France was at this point very important. France, under de 
Gaulle and Pompidou was skeptical towards European integration in the sense that it 
preferred a loose confederal structure. American initiatives towards a supranational 
Europe could disrupt relation between the U.S. and France. Washington then decided to 
keep a lower profile on supporting regionalism in Europe in order to improve relations.  
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However, this did not prevent the relationship between the two from reaching an 
all time low; the differences were many and complex. Furthermore, the European 
independence can be overstated; Europe was as dependent on America as it had been 
before. The American security guarantee was as important as ever, and during this 
period the U.S. demanded that Europe should take its share of the burden. On the other 
hand, American did make concessions. For example, the U.S. recognized that French 
and British nuclear forces were able to pose as deterrents on their own. Washington had 
tried for long to make these two countries give up their independents deterrence, in 
order to make Europe more dependent on American and thus have stronger control over 
the development in Western Europe.54 These examples serve to show how a weakened 
U.S. responded to a strengthened Europe, by trying to establish “special relationships” 
in order to preserve American interests. Also, the U.S. had to make certain concessions 
in order to preserve Atlantic relations. In addition, this example shows how Europe, 
more specifically the EC, was emerging as a potential power bloc. 
“The New Regionalism” is actually intended to provide an explanation for the 
process of European integration after the end of the Cold War, where the context moved 
from bipolarity to multipolarity. It was after this period that stronger initiatives came 
from within than from the outside. As mentioned in chapter two, the old regionalism 
was specific with regards to objectives while the new process of regionalism takes into 
account a greater diversity of dimensions and is more comprehensive. However, this 
thesis still argues the relevance of this theory in explaining the process of integration in 
Europe during the Cold War.  
The seeds that were sown in this period are what laid the foundations for Hettne’s 
theory, and the argument for this thesis on how the process of integration in Europe 
gained independence from American influence. This did happen slowly during the Cold 
War, especially during the period from 1969 to 1977 as described in the previous 
paragraph, but even more in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union. There are many 
critics of regionalism who believe that too much emphasis is put into regions and their 
development, and that one should instead concentrate on analysis on a larger scale. 
However, one should not underestimate the power of regionalism, and the impact it has 
had on the relationship between Europe and the United States, not to mention the impact 
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on Europe itself. What remains to be seen, is if there will be similar successful 
regionalist projects in other places in the world, and how America will respond to these.  
One weakness of Hettne’s theory can be that it only applies to the European Union 
as a regionalist project. However, this has no consequence for the argument in this 
thesis. 
 
3.2.3 “Defensive Realism” 
This thesis argues that defensive realism as described by Robert Jervis is useful in 
explaining American foreign policy during the Cold War, despite several critiques of 
the theory. The basic point of this theory is that states expand because they seek 
security. One of the theory’s critics is Farheed Zakaria. He does not see defensive 
realism as a complete theory and he argues that the theory’s emphasis on how a state 
expands due to insecurity and not from increased power is insufficient. In contrast to 
classical realism, where states expand when their power increases, defensive realism 
argues that fear is a factor which prompts the state to increase its influence. Zakaria then 
argues heavily that both of these theories have many flaws when one uses them to 
explain foreign policy, and therefore presents his own theory called state-centered 
realism.55 One of his arguments is that defensive realism’s emphasis on threats and 
security is insufficient. According to him, these elements are easy to form into fitting 
arguments that explain policy. For example, decision makers can use preservation of 
national security as a reason to expand. Even so, Zakaria realizes that the link between 
threats and expansion does exist in international politics, and that it is useful to test 
this.56  
However, despite Zakaria’s criticism of the theory, this thesis argues that 
defensive realism is useful in explaining American foreign policy towards Europe in the 
case of containing Communism. There was a great deal of fear about the threat of 
Communism’s expansion in the U.S. at this time, which came close to mass hysteria, 
and there can be no doubt that this fear helped to form policy. If Europe fell to 
Communism, it would soon spread to the rest of the world, including America. Thus, 
containing the Soviet Union by means of European regionalism was necessary for U.S. 
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security, and in this context it is clear that defensive realism serves well as an 
explanation of American responses to European integration during the Cold War.  
It is important to note though, that this fear was perhaps not as strong in the period 
from 1969 to 1977 as it was in the 1950s. Despite this fact, concern about Soviet 
expansion was strong in the U.S. during these years. Furthermore, when taking into 
account the fact that the U.S. had been weakened by the failure in the Vietnam War, it 
was clear that Europe was again important as deterrent against the Soviet Union. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the U.S. made concessions in order to preserve a 
good relationship with Europe. This again shows how important Europe was for the 
security of the U.S. during the Cold War, and then especially during the years from 
1969 to 1977 where the U.S. had been weakened from having waged a destructive war 
in Asia. Even though the Soviet threat was declining, the Nixon administration was 
concerned about the policy of “ostpolitik”. The administration feared that the Soviet 
Union might try and persuade the West Germans to abandon their strong ties to NATO 
and the West.57  
In addition, Jervis’ point on whether a state faces an aggressor state or not is 
important. The Soviet Union was regarded by the U.S. as an aggressor state, and this 
would explain why the America acted as it did. Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 2, 
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought security for themselves and their major 
differences made them fear each other. The only way to save one’s own ideology and 
way of life was to remove the other; they were both a threat to each other. The 
integration of Europe was an important part of this goal; it contributed to the security of 
the U.S. and helped to export its values and ideology. 
 
3.2.4 “State-centered Realism” 
Critics may say that this theory’s emphasis, which is solely on foreign policy, is a 
weakness. There are many who are of the opinion that domestic and foreign policy often 
are the same. The author of this thesis is of the opinion that these two spheres of 
policymaking must be separated in order to better analyze them both. Thus “state-
centered realism” is therefore an important part of explaining American foreign policy 
together with “defensive realism.” Zakaria criticizes defensive realism, and uses this to 
strengthen his own theory. He argues that defensive realism’s focus on threats and 
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security, as well as its statement that states act according to the degree of threats they 
perceive, is not convincing and needs to be developed further. His own argument is that 
states expand when decision-makers experience an increase in state power. However, 
one can argue that this does not explain states which are satisfied with the status quo, 
and which are only interesting in maintaining security.58 This is where the author of this 
thesis finds it useful to combine the two theories instead of arguing that one is better 
than the other. Zakaria uses his theory to explain American foreign policy between 1865 
and 1908. This thesis proceeds beyond this, by testing whether this theory can also 
apply to American foreign policy towards European integration during the Cold War.  
“State-centered realism” is especially relevant when it comes to America’s 
position after World War II, when it was one of the two superpowers dominating the 
world. Hence, the U.S. tried to expand its interests and influence in Europe by taking 
advantage of its position after World War II. America did this by promoting European 
regionalism, because it knew that the integration of Europe would serve American 
interests. Furthermore, since the power of the U.S. was at its peak, its potential of 
influencing the restoration and integration of Europe was indeed great. 
When applying this theory on the period from 1969 to 1977, however, its 
explanatory power decreases heavily. As already mentioned in the two sections above, 
the U.S. had experienced a considerable blow after the Vietnam War. This made 
America appear much weaker than it had been at the end of World War II. Despite this 
fact, it can not be any doubts that the U.S. was still one of the two superpowers in the 
world and had not lost its influence over, or importance to, the nations of Western 
Europe. Furthermore, as one of the two superpowers, America did use the ability as 
such a power to expand its influence in Europe. The promotion of regionalism in 
Western Europe would not have been possible if the U.S. had not possessed the power it 
did. However, the decline of the U.S. after the Vietnam War does weaken the 
explanatory power of “state-centered realism” for describing American foreign policy, 
and more specifically American responses to European integration during the period 
from 1969 to 1977. 
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3.2.5 “Hegemony Theory” 
Hegemony theory, and then especially the article by Volgy and Imwalle, 
“Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order,” further serves to 
explain the position of the United States during the Cold War. As mentioned, they argue 
that hegemony was a structural feature of the Cold War as well as bipolarity. These 
authors’ emphasis on hegemony in the international system after the end of World War 
II has much relevance for America’s influence over the process of integration in Europe. 
Furthermore, the American influence on Europe which resulted from providing 
economic assistance and military deterrent against Communistic aggression, moreover, 
is congruent with this theory. Thus, the U.S. with its economic and military strength 
presided over Europe as a hegemon obtaining control by providing economic assistance 
to a devastated Europe, and protecting it militarily from the Soviet Union. This thesis 
understands control in the sense that the U.S. obtained most of its overall goals by 
supporting and advocating European integration, and as such became the hegemon. It 
can be argued however, that this hegemony was not entirely stable. After the early years 
of European invitations, tensions started to grow between the two sides of the Atlantic, 
and the extent to which the nations of Europe accepted American leadership on all 
international issues can be debated. The fact still remains that America was a hegemon 
in the sense of cultural domination by its import of liberal values economically and 
politically to Europe. In addition, its presence was both wanted and welcomed by 
almost every nation in Europe. 
The U.S. had been severely weakened by the Vietnam War, but this did not 
change the fact that it still possessed the power and the role as a hegemon, even in the 
period from 1969 to 1977. Despite having to make concessions to Europe in order to 
preserve a balance in transatlantic relations, and then especially with France, America 
was still the actor who guaranteed the security of the nations of Western Europe. The 
European Community had in this period gone from being six members to nine including 
Great Britain. With Europe concentrating on integration instead of “special 
relationships,” the U.S. had to acknowledge that both France and Britain had, as 
previous mentioned, nuclear arsenals capable of posing as deterrents on their own. 
Thus, the U.S. was still a hegemon presiding over Western Europe, but it was a 
weakened hegemon, which faced an emerging Europe in a process of integration that 
started moving towards greater independence for itself. 
 34 
Antonio Gramsci’s thoughts about how liberal democracies exercise their political 
power through a dominant world view instead of use of force or coercion is well suited 
to characterize America’s influence on Europe during the Cold War. The U.S. did not 
need to force its values or ideology on to Europe, these were both accepted willingly. 
However, this acceptance was in a way the price-tag which was attached to receiving 
the aid which was needed. Furthermore, it must be said that the differences in ideology 
were not that comprehensive between the two sides of the Atlantic, and therefore the 
differences that existed were easier to negotiate. When Gramsci wrote about 
“economism” and hegemony, there appears a clear connection with US-Europe relations 
during the Cold War. He argued that the hegemon needs to make certain economic 
sacrifices to address the interest of those it would “dominate.” In this context, as 
mentioned earlier, America made several economic concessions in order to please the 
European nations. This was necessary for achieving the overall goal, which of course 
was European integration. Even though there were massive protests in the U.S. from 
business corporations who felt that their interests (mostly gaining entrance to the 
European market) were not emphasized, America did make integration a higher priority. 
If America was in decline, then it might make sense to become more skeptical of a 
highly integrated rival in Europe, but it certainly made no sense to antagonize its allies; 
America was becoming more, not less, dependent on the latter and had to act 
accordingly. Concessions had to be made, and Western Europe and Japan obviously 
came first among America’s allies.59  
In the period from 1969 to 1977, even though the U.S. was weakened, the 
cultural impact of American remained in Western Europe:  
 
On the cultural side it seemed that an American-dominated mass culture was 
making the United States and Western Europe more and more alike. We saw the 
same movies and later even many of the same television programs, read many of 
the same books, wore many of the same clothes, and even began to eat much of 
the same food.60  
 
Citizens in America and Western Europe saw many of the same movies since the 
movie industry in the U.S. was greatly expanding into the leading industry in the world 
in this area. These films were of course exported to Europe, where the American way of 
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life portrayed intrigued the people of Western Europe. In addition, the export of food, 
literature and clothing also contributed to the melting together of the two sides of the 
Atlantic. Furthermore, another important feature of this period which did also affect 
Western Europe to a certain extent, was the export of the Hippie movement, the youth 
rebellion and the music during this era in the late 1960s and early 1970s. All of these 
examples help to underline the importance and the major impact of American culture on 
Western Europe, even though the U.S. had diminished as a hegemon over Western 
Europe. 
 
3.3 The Role of NATO during the Cold War (1945 - 1989) 
 
Relations between North American and European members of the Alliance are 
the bedrock of NATO. These countries share the same essential values and 
interests and are committed to the maintenance of democratic principles, making 
the security of Europe and that of North America indivisible.61 
 
When NATO was founded after the Second World War, it was very important for 
Europe to make sure that American commitments to the organization were deep. “In the 
negotiations to set up NATO, virtually every European country wanted to make the 
American commitment to Europe as automatic as possible.”62 The European emphasis 
on an integrated NATO force led by an American general suggested that American 
leadership was indeed welcome. In order to fight Communism, Western Europe had to 
be fitted into an Atlantic framework, and integral to this was NATO. The U.S., in 
addition, wanted to integrate Western Germany into NATO in order to strengthen the 
defense of Europe.63 
Under both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations, there were 
references to an integrated Europe functioning as a “third force.”  
 
Most of these references simply meant that a united Europe would be a third 
important actor in international politics, after the United States and the Soviet 
Union. There was rarely any implication that Europe would be an independent unit 
standing in the middle between the two existing superpowers; it was just an 
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additional one, and the expectation was almost always that it would be standing 
rather close to the United States.64  
 
The expression was much more often used in the Eisenhower administration than 
by the Kennedy administration, which in fact rarely made use of it. The emphasis in the 
latter was on the “Atlantic framework” and it was made clear that Europe had to behave. 
The reason for the Kennedy administration’s strict approach to European behavior was 
France’s Charles de Gaulle. He was the representative of the idea of an independent 
Europe functioning as a third force, and Washington would not support his kind of third 
force.”65 
This shows that European integration after Eisenhower did not necessarily mean 
total European independence. In other words, Europe should be independent in a way 
that suited the U.S. The American emphasis on the Atlantic framework and the 
incorporation of Western Germany into this was followed by a concern that Germany 
might in the end control European integration by virtue of being the strongest member 
nation. “The United States was obviously opposed to the integration of Europe if this 
took place under the leadership of a hostile power.”66 Even though the integration of 
Europe and membership in NATO were both under American control, it would seem 
that the U.S. did not foresee the future role of the EU in international politics and the 
post-Cold War development of NATO. There was apparently enough fear of the 
negative potential of European integration to make sure that the processes did not take 
on a life of their own, outside American control. The discussion of the role of NATO 
during the War on Terror and the current position of the EU in international politics are 
taken up in chapter 4, and offer sharp contrasts to the realities of the Cold War. 
 
3.4 American Presidents and their Responses to 
European Integration 
3.4.1 Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman  
  Even though the American policies towards European regionalism have more 
or less remained the same during the Cold War - that is, the overall goal has always 
been the same - different presidents ranging from Roosevelt to Reagan, have not had the 
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same view on how to deal with Europe. Some have been more skeptical than others to 
European integration, or its extent or how much emphasis should be put on transatlantic 
relations. 
  The Roosevelt administration was actually quite skeptical towards European 
integration immediately after the war. It feared that this could lead to “independent 
spheres of political influence and economic autarchy.”67 In addition, the fear that 
Germany would dominate an integrated Europe was already present in the wartime 
administration. This later changed with the onset of Marshall Aid, during which where 
the U.S. fully supported European integration. President Truman supported integration, 
but was disappointed by the lack of leadership in Europe.68 
  
3.4.2 Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy 
  It is interesting to note the term “third force” again. As mentioned in the 
previous section, references to Europe as a “third force” can be found during the 
Eisenhower administration. This term meant that Europe could represent a third actor in 
international politics, together with the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, the idea 
was that Europe would stand close to America, and not be completely independent, 
while Kennedy was president on the other hand, the term was hardly ever used. 
Apparently, the idea of Europe as a “third force” caused concern in the Kennedy 
administration since de Gaulle was in charge of France and had visions of an 
independent Europe which did not coincide with the plans of the American 
administration.69 It seems clear that in addition to executive support for regionalism in 
Europe during these years, there was also a fear of Europe becoming too independent 
and powerful enough to state its own interests. This would not be a problem as long as 
these interests overlapped with those of America. However, President Kennedy openly 
supported European integration when he gave a speech at Independence Hall in 1962. 
He compared the uniting of Western Europe with the uniting of the first thirteen 
colonies of British North America:  
 
The United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope and admiration. We 
do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its 
progress has been the basic object of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe 
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that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common 
defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining 
with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of 
commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all 
economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with 
whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks 
of building and defending a community of free nations.70  
 
The emphasis in this speech was the strong American support for European 
regionalism and the importance of transatlantic cooperation. What is interesting is how 
President Kennedy specified that Europe was to be a partner and not a rival. He also 
expressed how the U.S. regarded Europe as a partner to deal with on the basis of full 
equality, and in this context it is worth considering the extent of this. This speech 
suggested that Europe should play a greater role in the common defense, something 
which could be interpreted that the nations of Europe should start paying some of their 
own bills. In addition, President Kennedy stressed the need to lowering trade barriers, 
which was an area of dispute between the two sides of the Atlantic. It would seem that 
Europe had to adjust to American views and values for it to be an equal partner, and still 
the degree equality could be debated. The criteria had to be that Europe remained close 
to the U.S. and did not oppose U.S. policies. 
 
3.4.3 Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon 
Both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations were not pleased with the fact 
that Europe did not support America’s fight against Communism in Asia.71 This was yet 
another point in the continuing pattern of mutual disappointment the two experienced 
with each other. Europe did not understand why America put so much effort into 
fighting a war in Asia, a war opposed by most of Europe’s citizens. America on the 
other hand, did not understand why Europe did not support its war against Communism 
in Asia. Communism was after all a threat to democracy everywhere in the world. Even 
so, both these U.S. administrations supported European integration. In the 1960s 
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however, more emphasis was put on making sure American economic interests were 
protected.72  
President Johnson’s annual message to Congress on the state of the union in 1964 
reaffirmed U.S. support for European integration: 
  
In the Atlantic community we continue to pursue our goal of 20 years--a Europe 
that is growing in strength, unity, and cooperation with America. A great 
unfinished task is the reunification of Germany through self-determination. This 
European policy is not based on any abstract design. It is based on the realities of 
common interests and common values, common dangers and common 
expectations. These realities will continue to have their way--especially, I think, in 
our expanding trade and especially in our common defense. Free Americans have 
shaped the policies of the United States. And because we know these realities, 
those policies have been, and will be, in the interest of Europe. Free Europeans 
must shape the course of Europe. And, for the same reasons, that course has been, 
and will be, in our interest and in the interest of freedom.73  
 
In this speech, Johnson emphasized the common values and interests that Europe 
and America shared. Freedom was and is the foundation of any democracy, as well as 
self-determination. President Johnson repeated the words of President Kennedy when he 
emphasized cooperation and the expansion of trade and common defense. However, in 
this speech it is clear that the Johnson administration acknowledged European interests 
more than the Kennedy administration did. European integration was good for both the 
U.S. and the nations of Europe, both politically and economically. 
During the presidency of Richard Nixon, the emphasis fell on the “Atlantic 
framework” for integration in Europe; that is emphasis on NATO as the most important 
security organization in Europe. The U.S. played the ball over to the Europeans: 
“Washington was no longer to push for the most supranational forms of European 
integration.”74 Europe had to decide for itself what it wanted. The American emphasis 
then shifted over to the “Atlantic framework,” and not the process of integration of 
Europe. Growing skepticism towards the consequences of a Europe becoming too 
strong was beginning to show. Under Nixon there was the Year of Europe, which was 
an attempt to strengthen the transatlantic relationship within the “Atlantic framework.” 
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It can not be said to have been successful, especially when it came to the relationship 
between America and France. Important in this context however, is the pointing out of 
how the U.S. had global responsibilities while Europe only had regional ones, 
something which did not sit well with Europeans. Especially France, with de Gaulle and 
his predecessor Pompidou, did not agree with the Nixon administration’s proposal of 
military burden-sharing. In addition, Nixon made a linkage between the American 
security guarantee and European concession in the economic sphere which did not 
appeal to the EC.75  
It is interesting to note what President Nixon wrote in “United States Foreign 
policy for the 1970s – Relating National Interests: The Challenge of European Unity.” 
  
Our friends must soon decide, then, how they see Europe's role in the world and 
its relationship with us. The form and degree of its unity is for Europeans to settle. 
The United States has always supported the strengthening and enlargement of the 
European Community. We still do. We welcome cohesion in Europe because it 
makes Europe a sturdier pillar of the structure of peace. Regional cohesion 
contributes to world stability. And America's and Western Europe's fundamental 
interests are parallel in most areas of policy. For years, however, it was believed 
uncritically that a unified Western Europe would automatically lift burdens from 
the shoulders of the United States. The truth is not so simple. European unity will 
also pose problems for American policy, which it would be idle to ignore.76  
 
In this speech it is clear that the notion of European integration no longer was 
merely a positive one for America. First, Nixon made it clear that Europe needed to 
decide what its role in the world would be, and more importantly, what form its 
relationship to the U.S. should take. This could be seen as a sign of the U.S. growing 
weary of European opposition to its plans for the integration in Europe. Because of the 
weakened position of the U.S. due to the Vietnam War cooperation was encouraged, 
and this worked well regarding security but not on economic issues. “Europeans could 
not have it both ways.”77 If they wanted the American security guarantee, they needed 
to make economic concessions on their part. Finally, Nixon admits that integration 
could pose problems to the U.S. Regionalism in Europe had moved from being a mean 
of containing Communism and serving America’s interests to actually becoming a 
challenge for America. Challenges meant mostly economic disputes since the US 
                                                 
75
 Lundestad 2003: 175 - 185. 
76
 Richard M. Nixon, “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Report to the Congress”, February 18, 1970, 
(From Revolution to Reconstruction and what happened afterwards), 
http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rn37/writings/ch3_p1.htm (accessed January 26, 2007). 
77
 Lundestad 2003: 180. 
 41 
economy was experiencing problems and there was a need for Europe to start lowering 
trade tariffs and reduce protectionism in the agricultural sphere. 
 
3.4.4 Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan 
As a contrast to the Nixon administration’s focus on leaving European 
integration to the Europeans, the Carter administration had a more positive attitude to 
the European Community. President Carter even criticized the former administration for 
putting too little emphasis on the relationship with Europe. However, the years under 
Carter were characterized by few conflicts in the economic sphere and his 
administration did not spend much time with EC questions. In addition, there was not 
much development inside the EC itself either, resulting in little activity regarding 
transatlantic relations.78 As a result of this, this thesis does not analyze the Carter 
administration’s response to regionalism in Europe any further. 
  When Ronald Reagan assumed the Presidency, he started by taking a hard line 
against the Soviet Union. There was a great emphasis on deterring Communism in 
Europe by showing military power, especially nuclear power. The incentive to 
encourage Europe to increase its conventional forces disappeared. Furthermore, what 
also vanished was the need to consult Europe on matters of relations with the Soviet 
Union, something which troubled America’s ally. Even though Reagan in his second 
term had a change of heart and embraced cooperation with the Soviet Union, this did 
not completely remove the problems between the U.S. and Europe. In the mid 1980s 
there was also a shift away from containment to the “rollback” of Communism. The 
“Reagan Doctrine” was the strategy of tunneling weapons and financial support to third 
world countries in order to support anti-Communist resistance movements. The success 
of this doctrine was clear in the last years of the Reagan administration and “These 
successes also improved American-European relations and strengthened Washington’s 
position in Europe.”79 Despite this, a reaction came in Washington concerning the idea 
of a “Fortress Europe” in the economic sphere. European markets exclusively for 
Europeans did not serve America’s interests.80  
In his statement on the 25th anniversary of the European Community however, 
President Reagan appeared positive to European integration:  
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Let me reaffirm clearly the support of this administration for European unity. We 
consider a strong and united Europe not a rival, but a partner. As we enter the 
second quarter century of relations between the European Community and the 
United States, we face economic and political challenges as difficult as those 
which confronted our predecessors in 1957. However, the relationship between 
Western Europe and the United States has changed fundamentally. In those days 
the United States was the dominant partner, and Europe had a more dependent 
role. Now the economic weight of the two sides is more evenly balanced.81  
 
In this speech, President Reagan acknowledged the economic growth of the 
European Community and repeated the words of President Kennedy: Europe was and 
would always be a partner and not a rival. This part of the speech does not seem to have 
any elements of fear of a “Fortress Europe”, or suggestions of limiting European 
influence. The last part of this statement, however, proceeds as follows:  
 
Both Europe and the United States recognize that partnership involves 
responsibilities. These responsibilities apply to the economic area in particular 
where we both have the responsibility to avoid actions which have an adverse 
impact on our trading partners and to preserve our free trading system. They also 
extend to our common security interests, where we have the responsibility to 
cooperate on support for like-minded countries seeking closer Western ties, and to 
resist the efforts of those who do not share our values to extend their power and 
influence. The European Community, as well as the United States, will provide 
responsible leadership in these areas in the years ahead.82  
 
The emphasis on “responsibilities” and trade might suggest that there was a 
concern about European protectionism. This was a pattern which had a long tradition in 
the relationship between Europe and America. In addition, there were to be 
responsibilities concerning security interests. Especially the part emphasizing   the 
support of “like-minded countries” can perhaps be seen as a justification of the Reagan 
Doctrine to promote democracy over Communism. The last part where Reagan states 
that Europe as well as the U.S. would exercise leadership in the years ahead seems to 
have other implications. The fact remained that the U.S. would always have the last 
word, and America remained the sole leader despite great words about “shared 
responsibility” and “shared leadership.”  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempts, through a critical evaluation of the theories presented, to 
establish the reasons for America’s initial positive response towards European 
integration. Furthermore, the evaluation also explains how the relationship between the 
U.S. and Europe changed, especially after the 1960s where America grew disappointed 
of the development in Europe. Finally, this chapter highlights how hegemony was an 
important factor in the relationship between Europe and America during the Cold War. 
Geir Lundestad’s theory of “Empire by Invitation” shows how Europe welcomed 
American leadership at first, but only to resist later when European interests did not 
coincide with those of the U.S. As mentioned earlier, the need for American economic 
and military support was great. After receiving support, Europe started to question 
American leadership, but still continued to welcome American presence in Europe. The 
tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic started to shift from good to bad 
whenever issues of disagreements appeared. Even though the U.S. achieved most of its 
goals by supporting integration, the end result did not seem to be exactly as planned. 
America did not foresee the resistance which arose in the nations of Europe, as it 
believed that their interests coincided, which they mostly did, but not in all areas. The 
crucial points here are the enormous power that the U.S. possessed after the war, the 
European dependency on American aid, and the tensions which arose whenever the two 
parties experienced a conflict of interests. The weakening of the U.S. during the period 
from 1969 to 1977 did have an effect on the relationship between the two sides of the 
Atlantic. When Britain became a member of the European Community, London resisted 
the forming of a “special relationship” with the U.S. and instead concentrated on 
European integration together with France and Germany. However, the need for the 
American security guarantee remained as Europe strongly encouraged the presence of 
American troops in Western Europe. 
The theory of regionalism as presented by Bjørn Hettne shows how the European 
regionalist project got a life of its own. Hettne’s “New regionalism” theory describes 
how the initiatives began to come from within Europe. Also, the negative sides of 
regionalism, like the idea of a “Fortress Europe,” are clearly present when regarding the 
American frustration with the agriculture policies of Europe. “New Regionalism” serves 
to explain how an American sponsored European integration with the goal of obtaining 
U.S. interests evolved into something more. This regionalism changed Europe into an 
 44 
economic and political community, or more specifically an autonomous power bloc 
which gained independence from America. However, despite this independence and 
self-awareness, Europe remained deeply connected to the U.S. throughout the Cold War 
because of the continued need for economic aid and military protection from 
Communism. An important point is that with growing European integration came a 
growing demand to have a stronger voice, especially in matters concerning Europe. 
Especially during the years from 1969 to 1977, the process of European integration 
accelerated with the admission of Britain in 1973. The initiatives from within became 
stronger as France, and now also Britain, concentrated on the development of the 
European Community instead of a “special relationship” with the U.S. 
Robert Jervis’ notions of defensive realism can also help to explain American 
foreign policy during the Cold War. Defensive realism puts emphasis on how states 
expand because of fear, and this can also be applied to the situation of the U.S. after the 
war. The fear of a competing, aggressive ideology posed by the Soviet Union can be 
seen as a motivating factor in American support for European integration. Especially 
important is the security dilemma, where the increased security of one state can have a 
negative effect on another. In this context we need to bear in mind the arms race which 
started between the Soviet Union and the U.S. 
Fareed Zakaria’s theory of state-centered realism can be useful in explaining how 
the U.S. responded to regionalism in Europe during the years of the Cold War. As state-
centered realism claims, nations will make an attempt to increase their influence when 
decision-makers experience an increase in state power. This is what happened after 
World War II, when the U.S. was one of the two superpowers of the world. The 
American means for increasing influence were to support and advocate European 
integration. Firstly, European integration served as a way of achieving important goals 
and strengthening the U.S. against the Soviet Union. Secondly, it was a mean for 
extending American values and way of life across the Atlantic. However, the fact that 
the U.S. found itself weakened in the period from 1967 to 1977, as a result of the war in 
Vietnam, makes this theory less relevant. In the context of being a superpower, it seems 
likely that this could be a reason why the U.S. tried to expand its influence over the 
development in Western Europe. 
  The influence of hegemony on Euro-American relations during the Cold War, 
as described by Volgy and Imwalle, explains how America became a hegemon when 
encouraging and supporting regionalism in Europe. As mentioned, this was not 
 45 
hegemony by force, but more in a sense of cultural domination. This is one of the 
aspects of Antonio Gramsci’s theory, namely that the hegemon relies on values instead 
of power as means of “ruling.” The cultural impact of America on the nations of 
Western Europe is an important point. The export of American movies, clothing, 
literature, music and food heavily influenced Western Europe, and contributed to 
making the two sides of the Atlantic more alike. America had the economic and military 
power to set the rules of the game after being invited by the Europeans. In exchange for 
receiving aid and protection, they had to embrace the American system of liberal values 
in economy and politics. In addition, the Gramsci’s thoughts about “economism” and 
how the hegemon needs to make sacrifices in order to achieve and sustain its hegemony, 
are important when considering the Cold War. America did sacrifice certain economic 
interests, but his was necessary for the further development of the integration of Europe. 
Following the argument of Volgy and Imwalle, it is clear that the U.S. as the hegemon 
presided over Europe and had the strength and ability to prevent Communism from 
disrupting its hegemony during the Cold War. 
  The role of NATO during the Cold War is underlined by its importance to both 
Europe and the U.S. The organization was necessary for the integration of Europe and 
as a collective military defense against the Soviet Union. The American domination of 
NATO was welcomed by Europeans, who preferred to dwell safely under the wings of 
the superpower. America had no problem with taking the lead, as this would ensure its 
own security and help to draw a line against the East. Thus, the organization had several 
roles. Firstly, it was a mean to help the further integration of Europe. Secondly, it 
strengthened the containment of Communism. And third, it evolved to be the glue that 
held Europe and America together. 
  When considering the responses by different administrations, it is possible to 
see several patterns emerge. One clear pattern is support of European integration as a 
mean of fighting Communism, with emphasis on how a united Europe is less likely to 
be influenced by the Soviet Union in contrast to individual states. Also important is how 
some administrations feared that the economic cost of defending Europe would be too 
much for the U.S. European integration was encouraged because it would enable Europe 
to contribute more to its own defense, and thus relieving America of some of the costs. 
However, the pattern which is really interesting for this thesis is how Europe can be 
regarded as a “third force.” The fear of Europe becoming too strong and independent 
was present in several administrations during the Cold War, and it was made clear that 
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Europe had to “behave,” that is not to oppose the U.S. This was not a major concern 
with every administration, but it was evident that it was a concern which developed over 
time as the process of European integration accelerated. Following this was the need for 
a stricter policy towards Europe by the U.S. in order to ensure that the cooperation on 
American terms continued. Especially the Nixon-Kissinger administration stressed, as 
mentioned earlier, that Europe had regional responsibilities while the U.S. had global 
responsibilities. This signalized that the U.S. did not want Europe to be an equal partner 
and ally, but a partner and ally nonetheless who knew its place. The role of Europe as a 
“third force” will be discussed more in chapter four of this thesis. 
  How the different theories used in this chapter relate to the way various 
executive administrations reacted to Europe reveals different patterns. The presidency 
of Richard Nixon is covered above, and will not be repeated here. The period of the 
Carter administration will not be discussed here due to the fact that transatlantic 
relations during this period were stable, and interaction was at a low. During the 
presidencies of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Reagan both 
“state-centered realism” and “defensive realism” have much relevance. American 
policies towards Europe during these years were characterized by the fact that the U.S. 
had experienced an increase in power after World War II. Thus, America tried to 
influence the development in Europe by promoting integration in the region. In addition, 
the promotion of regionalism in Europe was triggered by the need to establish a 
deterrent against Communist aggression from the Soviet Union. American security 
could then be seen as a motivating factor for promoting European integration. “Empire 
by invitation” also has much relevance during these presidencies as well as the whole 
period of the Cold War. Even though transatlantic relations had its ups and downs, the 
European demand of the presence of American troops in Western Europe remains 
throughout the whole period. “The new regionalism” on the other hand, has no 
relevance before the presidency of Richard Nixon, which is discussed above. Nor has it 
much relevance during the presidency of Carter, since this was a time where there were 
very few developments in the EC. However, during the Reagan presidency the 
development of European integration started to accelerate again, making the theory 
relevant for this period.  This is clear when reviewing the adoption of the Single 
European Act of 1985-86, where “the EC took on new life.”83 The European leadership 
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was strengthened by President Mitterand, Chancellor Kohl and Commission president 
Jacques Delors.84 Hegemony theory is also relevant to these administrations during the 
Cold War. By providing security guarantees for protection against the Soviet Union and 
economic aid to the nations of Western Europe, the U.S. established itself as a hegemon. 
This situation never changed during the Cold War, or under any of the presidencies 
which are discussed here. At some point the hegemony was weakened, but it was not 
broken. This is the core concept of Volgy and Imwalle’s article of bipolarity and 
hegemony during the Cold War. Antonio Gramsci’s thoughts about how liberal 
democracies exercise their power through a dominate world view instead of coercion is 
also relevant. The U.S. never forced the nations of Western Europe into receiving aid, 
but they expected them to adapt its values and ideology in return. 
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Chapter 4: The Difference between USA and Europe: The 
Changing Relationship during the War on Terror. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the American response to the 9/11 attacks which led to 
the War on Terror. It also discusses European reactions and the difference of opinion 
between Europe and America regarding the struggle against global terrorism. 
Furthermore, the war in Afghanistan is an important part of this chapter, with emphasis 
on how the U.S. was supported by Europe in its war against the Taliban regime there. 
The Iraq War, which followed after the war in Afghanistan, shows the contrasts 
between this and the former military campaign. This war contributed to further 
deepening of the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic, where European opposition 
grew strong against American unilateralism.  
In addition, this chapter shows how the Iraq War not only led to a disruption of 
transatlantic relations, but also a division inside the EU itself. Some of the nations of the 
EU sympathized with the U.S. and supported going to war against Iraq as well as 
offering military forces to aid the U.S. The role of NATO during the War on Terror is a 
crucial part in this chapter. The reality after the Cold War is very different and the 
challenges for this security organization are many. The world system is no longer 
bipolar, and the enemy is no longer a single actor, but rather a network of actors 
residing in multiple states. How the U.S. perceives the usefulness of NATO after 9/11 is 
a discussion subject worth analyzing, and also how this is connected with the American 
response to regionalism in Europe. 
Furthermore, this chapter also discusses and analyzes some aspects of the 
political and cultural differences between America and Europe, and how these affect 
American responses to European integration. Does the U.S. feel that the European 
Union has played out its role and performed its purpose? Is European opposition to 
American unilateralism a hindrance to U.S. plans? Or does the EU still perform a useful 
role for the U.S.? American relations with the old Soviet states of Eastern Europe seem 
to show a degree of loyalty to the U.S. there. Could this be dividing Europe, and in that 
context would a division of Europe be in American interests? Finally, this chapter 
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establishes whether the theories from chapter 2 also apply to U.S. responses to 
regionalism during the current War on Terror. 
 
4.2 America and Europe before 9/11: The Presidency of 
George W. Bush 
  
When George W. Bush was elected the new president of the U.S., most of 
Europe was unsure of where he would stand on foreign policy issues. Very early signs 
of American unilateralism emerging with no regard for international bodies like the 
U.N. were discomforting to Europe, as were America’s refusal to support the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, in general, 
Washington was prepared to cooperate in Europe because it was here the U.S. had its 
most vital allies. This administration also saw the value of NATO as an instrument for 
America to guide the development in Europe. Despite a positive attitude towards 
integration in Europe, the relationship between Europe and America during the early 
period of President Bush’s first term was uneasy. Growing U.S. unilateralism, disregard 
for international bodies and agreements, and a number of economic disputes contributed 
to a strain in the relationship between Europe and America.85  The emphasis on NATO 
is further discussed later in this chapter under section 4.5.  
 
4.3 Afghanistan 
 
And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the 
Taliban:  Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who 
hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you 
have unjustly imprisoned…...Close immediately and permanently every terrorist 
training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in 
their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full 
access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer 
operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban 
must act, and act immediately.  They will hand over the terrorists, or they will 
share in their fate.86  
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With this began the war in Afghanistan and the War against terror. This speech 
by President Bush shows that the U.S. was clear in its demands and would not be 
compromising. This formed the basis for the Bush administration’s war against 
terrorism and the president proclaimed what was to be called the Bush Doctrine: “We 
will make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor 
them.”87  Following 9/11, the U.S. received massive support from all of its allies and 
even Vladimir Putin’s Russia became a part of the coalition against terrorism. Moral 
support even came from the Organization of Islamic States.88 States joined up and 
supported the military strike against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, who had close 
ties with the terrorist organization known as al Qaeda that was allegedly responsible for 
the attack on America. 
With this overwhelming support from Europe it seemed that the Atlantic 
relationship had been reestablished and was characterized by more harmony than the 
first months under the new administration. However, the fact that NATO invoked article 
5 for the first time, did not mean that the U.S. readily accepted or asked for military 
assistance from European countries. With the experiences from the Kosovo war in 
mind, the U.S. wanted exclusive control over operations in Afghanistan. A repetition of 
the ineffective NATO procedures for fighting a war was not in accordance with the 
Bush administration’s strategy. Initially, there was to be no role for NATO at all. War 
by a committee did not and does to appeal to Washington.89 It is clear that the U.S. 
administration wanted moral support, but not necessarily military aid in its war against 
terror in Afghanistan. It is easier to ask for aid after a military operation, because the 
reconstruction work after a war is always more difficult and expensive. America prefers 
to be totally autonomous when conducting a war. In addition, Europe, with its emphasis 
on diplomacy does not fit in with the strategic aspects of the War against Terror. The 
U.S. prefers direct action over diplomacy and discussion when fighting a war. There is a 
clear contrast between the two sides of the Atlantic in this respect, and this explains why 
the U.S. wants to be autonomous and not having to experience allies questioning its 
tactics. However, everyone seems to be invited to assist with the reconstruction process, 
at least economically and militarily. This pattern will also be discussed in the section 
concerning the war in Iraq.  
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4.4 The War in Iraq.  
  
After its initial success in Afghanistan, the U.S. turned its attention towards Iraq 
and Saddam Hussein. The official motivation for this campaign was that Iraq possessed 
weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein’s regime had ties with al Qaeda. 
At first, certain forces inside the administration were skeptical to including NATO and 
the UN in the campaign, but in September 2002 the United Nations was asked to 
support America’s decision to invade Iraq. Britain quickly announced its support of 
U.S. plans for the military intervention in Iraq. However, the rest of the EU was divided 
on the issue.  
France and Germany were particularly skeptical to the use of force and wanted 
to give the UN inspectors in Iraq more time to establish the existence of weapons of 
mass destruction. Central and Eastern European countries on the other hand, had strong 
sympathy for the American-British position. “When the Bush administration announced 
a new strategic doctrine emphasizing preemption over deterrence this was perceived in 
Europe as very negative.”90 No evidence of weapons of mass destruction was found in 
Iraq, but Washington still prepared for war. This led to increased criticism of the U.S. in 
Europe, especially from the public. As Germany had refused to offer any military or 
economic assistance to an American led attack on Iraq, France followed by taking a 
stand against the U.S. According to President Chirac, America had to be restrained. The 
relationship between Paris and Washington became cool, but this also led to further 
division inside the EU. Central and Eastern European countries were afraid of anything 
that could slow down their integration into NATO, and these nations saw the U.S. as 
their main protector. The fact that the U.S. still wanted NATO to be the dominant 
security organization in Europe showed that America feared what the EU as an 
independent force could do to its sphere of influence. American and British forces 
attacked Iraq on March 20, 2003 with superior forces crushing Iraqi defenses within a 
short period of time. Public opinion in Europe continued to be against the invasion, and 
after a while also in the U.S.  and Britain.91  
At the present time America is still struggling to stabilize the new government in 
Iraq, but this seems to be a most difficult task as Iraq seems to be moving towards civil 
war. After George W. Bush won the reelection in 2005 the U.S. have made some efforts 
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to improve relations with the EU and strengthen the cooperation through NATO. 
However, the division inside Europe together with the fact that the U.S. is focusing 
more on “special relationships” with Eastern Europe is making transatlantic relations 
worse than ever. 
 
4.4 European Opposition and Division. 
4.4.1 The Differences between Europe and America 
With the history of European regionalism and dependency of American support, 
this requires a closer look on the relationship between the two. European opposition to 
the war in Iraq did not sit well with the Bush administration. The relationship between 
the two sides of the Atlantic has been varied since the end of the Cold War.  
Britain was America’s strongest supporter for the Iraq War. Other European 
countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Denmark, Ireland and later several smaller 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe also openly supported the American 
campaign. The nations from Western Europe that supported the American campaign 
“…had traditionally been close to the United States and decidedly Atlantic in their 
orientation.”92 The nations from the Central and Eastern parts, however, saw, and still 
see, the U.S. as their main protector after the decline of the Soviet Union, and the most 
important issue for them was their integration into NATO. Another important factor for 
the support of the U.S. was the frustration among many European countries over the 
French tendency to appear as the official spokesman for the EU.93  
The differences between Europe and America have always been there. One can 
start with the aftermath of the Second World War, where the two sides faced completely 
different realities. Europe had been devastated by war, while the U.S. had been 
strengthened. According to Steinar Hansson, “The U.S. had grown by its wars, and 
never been in a war which had overthrown its hegemony.”94 In contrast to Europe then, 
the U.S. had benefited from its wars.95 This can help us understand why some nations in 
Europe have a stronger tendency towards diplomacy than military conflict; its history 
has taught the devastating costs of war. The foundation of the EU is built on a peace 
dimension. In order to prevent history from repeating itself, the EU shall make sure that 
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its members never lead aggressive policies toward each other. All states in Europe 
recognize the necessity of such an arrangement because it is in the interest of everyone. 
America, on the other hand, has only experienced what can be benefited from war and 
thus has a stronger tendency toward going to war to achieve its goals. However, 
Hansson does not seem to take into account the Vietnam War, which severely weakened 
the U.S. The same can be said about the Korean War and World War II. He still has a 
good point when we regard the latter. After World War II the U.S. emerged, at first, as 
the only superpower in the world with nuclear capabilities. Compared to the nations of 
Europe, America had not been devastated by war and its influence after 1945 had been 
greatly increased. In that context, it seems credible to suggest that the U.S. had 
benefited from war. 
Noam Chomsky states that “The United States has always had an ambivalent 
attitude towards Europe.”96 On one hand, he argues, there is the view of a unified 
Europe which would serve U.S. corporations by providing markets. On the other hand, 
there is the fear of Europe moving off in a different direction than the U.S. He goes on 
by emphasizing the importance of Eastern Europe, and how easier it is to influence this 
region of Europe than for example to Germany and France, which are “big, industrial 
countries that could move in a somewhat more independent direction.”97 Chomsky is 
also preoccupied with the American hatred for the European social system, and he gives 
this a lot of weight by arguing that undermining the social standards in Western Europe 
would be a big benefit for the United States.98  However, the author of this thesis feels 
that Chomsky uses words which are too strong. It would be more plausible to say that 
the current conservative administration perceives some European nations to be too 
liberal, and that this can generate some skepticism towards the European social system. 
It is also hard to see how undermining the social system in Europe would be a benefit 
for the U.S. In addition, Chomsky does not succeed in explaining how undermining the 
social standards in Europe would be good for the U.S. 
The American concern that Europe might take an independent course seems to 
be strong according to Chomsky. He claims that policy planning since World War II 
reflects this. He even goes so far as to say that the oil in Iraq is so important to the U.S. 
that it would tolerate no rivals whatsoever. “….the U.S.’ enemies are Europe and Asia. 
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These are the regions of the world that could move toward independence.”99 According 
to this view, it would seem that the EU represents a threat more than an ally to the 
U.S.100 The reason why Chomsky believes European independence is dangerous for the 
U.S. is because it would give Europe the power to oppose America. His claim is that the 
U.S. is afraid of giving up control over states or regions because it is never clear which 
direction they will then move in regarding support of America. Even though he has 
some good points, Chomsky’s argumentation is not especially convincing. His ideas 
tend to be too extreme, but perhaps that is the idea to effectively spice up his message, 
which is that the U.S. is on a dangerous path towards global hegemony. This thesis 
believes this view is a little farfetched; it is not likely that the EU will ever be an enemy 
of the U.S. Despite many disagreements, America and Europe are bound together by 
both history and common interests. A conflict would not be in the interests of either of 
them since they both have a degree of dependence on one another. Europe needs 
America because it is a superpower with substantial military strength. Furthermore, it 
does not matter how strong a state is, even a superpower needs friends and allies. 
Especially since the number of enemies of the U.S. are not decreasing as the War on 
Terror progresses. However, even though extreme, Chomsky’s opinion that the U.S. 
could regard Europe as an enemy makes an important point. Is Europe becoming more a 
competitor than an ally? In this context, what would the American response be? 
Geir Lundestad stresses that Europe and America have different cultural 
dispositions: “….views on terrorism, on the use of force, on defense spending and on 
the environment are different on the two sides of the Atlantic.” These differences make 
the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic difficult, and cooperation in the 
war against terror suffers as a result. He argues that these differences are clear when 
regarding different attitudes to “outlaw governments,” “rogue states” and “the Axis of 
evil. The U.S. prefers to put heavy pressure on such states while Europe can be said to 
believe more in “constructive engagement” when dealing with them. Lundestad 
concludes that none of the approaches seem to have produced results, but this example 
underlines the major differences in culture between the two sides of the Atlantic.101  
The differences between America and Europe are many. Francis Fukuyama has 
an important point when he speaks of the difference of perception regarding terrorism:  
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Europeans more often tended to assimilate the September 11 attacks to their own 
experience with terrorism from groups like the Irish Republican Army or the 
Basque ETA, regarding it as a surprisingly successful one-of-a-kind event, an 
outlier in a phenomenon more commonly marked by car bombs or 
assassinations.102  
 
For Americans on the other hand, this attack put a tremendous shock on the 
population and left a scar which will never heal, according to Fukuyama.103 The 
different perceptions of the attacks help explain the difference of opinion on how to act 
in response. Europe, comparing the attack with their experiences with terrorism, does 
not react in the same way as the U.S. Many European nations favor diplomacy and 
dialogue despite the sympathy of America’s need for revenge. The U.S., on the other 
hand, does not have similar experiences to relate to, and thus reacts in a much stronger 
way. War is the only way to make it right, to retaliate and have revenge. 
Svein Melbye also talks about basic differences which enhance the rift between 
the U.S. and the EU. First of all is their different preference when concerning the 
forming of the international system. The U.S. favors keeping its position as the only 
global superpower, while the EU, and then especially France, does not want to see the 
American position remain unchallenged. According to Melbye, “Seen through the eyes 
of the French, a combined Europe within the EU and under French-German leadership 
would be the most natural and realistic power political competitor to the U.S.”104 It 
would seem that after 2003, other European states, in addition to Germany, also share 
the French view. Another area of difference is when it comes to a shared assessment of 
threats. After the Cold War, a period when European security was important for both 
parts came the reality of Europe not being in need of American security to the same 
extent anymore. In addition, Europe is no longer the primary place where threats against 
American security are situated. For example, most politicians and experts in both the 
U.S. and Europe agree that international terrorism and the spreading of weapons of 
mass destruction are the greatest challenges to global security in our time. However, 
according to Melbye, it is clear that the view of these threats made by the Bush 
administration is different from the view in Europe. He argues that both sides of the 
Atlantic agree that the U.S. is the main target for terrorists, and that especially 
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Europeans believe that Europe is a secondary target. Whereas the threat from terrorism 
is given a lot more weight in the U.S., it is received more with ease in Europe.105 With 
the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, however, it would seem that Europe is not 
safe from terrorism either. 
Differences between the two sides of the Atlantic are one issue; it helps to 
explain the growing frustration the two parties have with each other. The core subject of 
this thesis, however, is American responses to regionalism in Europe. What are these 
responses? It would seem that when we regard the support from Eastern European 
countries and the recognition they get in return (Poland was given an area of 
responsibility in the rebuilding of Iraq), that European integration might not serve U.S. 
interests in the same way anymore. By pushing Western Europe aside and strengthening 
relations with the East, it would seem that the Bush administration favors a division of 
Europe. This way, the administration neutralizes those who oppose its policies, and 
receives new allies when creating stronger bonds with Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it 
is much easier for the U.S. to relate to single leaders of different states, than a 
“committee” of many representatives from several nations. 
European regionalism does not have the same value anymore for the U.S., at 
least not on the political level. The economic advantages, however, will probably be 
sustained. Even though Europe has gained a lot of power and independence by 
integrating its economy, and the U.S. faces difficulties when trying to oppose Europe on 
economic issues, the EU does not stand fully united. Politically, the Bush 
administration’s actions towards Eastern Europe resemble the old standard “divide and 
conquer” strategy, where a disobedient Europe is neutralized by dividing it in two; one 
for and one against the Iraq War. It is worth considering whether the division of Europe 
was created internally by Europeans or externally by the U.S. Is it possible that such 
disagreements would have surfaced without the Iraq War? This is a difficult question to 
answer, but one thing is certain, and that is that the Bush administration certainly took 
advantages of the division in the EU. 
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4.4.2 European Division 
 
As the divergent European responses to the Iraqi war revealed, most of Western 
Europe rejected the Bush Doctrine’s rationale for unilateral military action in 
favour of diplomacy and a combination of economic incentives and sanctions to 
encourage the peaceful resolution of international crises.106 
 
However, the largest form of criticism came from France and Germany. Other 
European nations, along with Britain, openly supported the American plans for a pre-
emptive strike on Iraq, or they favored an internationalist approach, that is emphasis on 
the UN and the Security Council, on the conflict.107 
The emphasis on Eastern Europe was clear when Donald Rumsfeld spoke of the 
separation between the “New Europe” and the “Old Europe.” He did so, knowing well 
that several Eastern European decision makers were prepared to give America support 
for the Iraq War. The famous “letter of the eight,” was a statement made by eight heads 
of state in Central and Eastern Europe, where they pledge their support to the American 
led war in Iraq. None of the other countries in the EU saw this coming, and reactions 
were strong, especially in France, Germany and Greece. “These developments chimed 
well with the Rumsfeld view that France and Germany could be brushed aside as ‘Old 
Europe’ while a ‘New Europe’, its ‘centre of gravity moving east’, understood better the 
new geo-politics around the Bush Doctrine.”108 In this context, a division of Europe 
served the Bush administration well when it came to support for the war in Iraq. 
Moreover, the ongoing plan of placing a missile defense in Eastern Europe, more 
specifically in Poland and The Czech Republic, shows the importance of this part of 
Europe for the Bush administration. The official view states the following regarding the 
geographical deployment of the missile defense: 
 
So in order to defend Europe, for technical reasons, we determined it was best to 
have a modest installation in Poland, with radars in the Czech Republic. That 
allows us to defend almost all of NATO. And that's certainly in our interest. So 
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this is first of all about defending Europe, not about defending the United 
States.109 
 
The fact that the U.S. claims that its actions are purely for the defense of Europe, 
is perhaps a little hard to believe. Clearly, there must be other motives behind this. The 
emphasis on European defense probably comes from the intent of strengthening 
American security. Thus, this underlines the importance of Europe for the preservation 
of the security of the U.S. It is hard to believe that Bush administration would engage in 
such a project solely for the protection of Europe. Furthermore, the renewed emphasis 
by the administration on “special relationships” is very disturbing for the rest of Europe. 
This discussion will continue in section 4.5. 
 
4.5 The Role of NATO 
  
In the beginning of President Bush’s first term, Washington was prepared to act 
in a cooperative manner in U.S.-Euro relations. Europe was where America’s closest 
allies were situated, and “NATO gave the United States a unique instrument with which 
to guide developments in Europe.”110  According to Geir Lundestad, the U.S. believed 
that the expansion of NATO meant strengthening America’s role in Europe. After 
America had been attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, NATO invoked its 
Article 5 for the first time. This meant that the attack was considered to be an attack on 
all NATO members, and they all were obligated to assist America. Washington realized 
the need for support when fighting terrorism, and appreciated the support from members 
of NATO.111 At this point, transatlantic relations seemed to have moved into a harmonic 
state of cooperation and the importance of NATO had been reaffirmed. 
  Strong disagreements between Europe and the U.S. became apparent when 
America revealed its plans to extend the war against terrorism by preparing to invade 
Iraq and possibly Iran and North Korea. “There was an increasing suspicion in Europe 
that Washington was not considering its NATO allies quite as necessary as before.”112 
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Even though the U.S. welcomed support from NATO, it was clear, according to 
Lundestad that America preferred to have exclusive control over the war in 
Afghanistan. With the decision to go to war in Iraq the U.S. turned away from NATO, 
and instead relied on an ad hoc coalition of the willing. Furthermore, the new conflicts 
which were far away from Europe made NATO less relevant for the U.S. However, 
according to Lundestad, the U.S. still wanted NATO to be the most important security 
organization in Europe. “The Bush administration was much more afraid of the EU 
becoming an independent force than its predecessor had been.”113 In order to disrupt the 
EU’s military plan, Washington wanted to establish a rapid reaction force within 
NATO, and even try to tie the EU closer to NATO. This, as mentioned in previous 
chapters, shows America’s fear of Europe evolving into a third force in international 
relations. The Bush administration had begun to regard NATO as less relevant than 
before. However, it still preferred that the military structure of Europe remained in the 
Atlantic framework rather than a separate European army outside American control. 
The administration demanded that NATO should be modernized; otherwise it would 
become even less relevant to Washington.114  
During the Cold War, NATO was a most efficient organization for dealing with 
the Soviet Union. Since the war on terror began, things have changed. Terrorism must 
be dealt with on many different levels. It became clear that the current administration 
regarded NATO as less relevant than before. ”NATO was to become America’s 
“toolbox” or “force multiplier” for interventions outside Europe.”115 The experience 
from Kosovo had shown the U.S. that conducting a war led by a committee was not 
effective. However, the U.S. stressed that the EU should not establish forces which 
could limit NATO’ supremacy. This meant of course limiting U.S. supremacy, which 
still needs NATO despite its growing unilateralist approach under the Bush 
administration.116 
The recent plans by the U.S. to establish a missile defense system in Eastern 
Europe, more specifically in Poland and the Czech Republic, have brought concern to 
both the EU and NATO. The fact that the U.S. has chosen to make agreements with 
these nations instead of dealing with the EU or NATO has created much uproar. This 
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issue shows how NATO, if not useful to the U.S., is overlooked. If it cannot function as 
an instrument for American foreign policy, then it is to be put aside. 
 
4.6 America and Europe in the War on Terror: Applying 
the Theories. 
4.6.1 “Empire by Invitation” 
Geir Lundestad’s theory of “empire by invitation” does not seem to have the 
same strong relevance today as it had during the Cold War. With the development of 
Europe into a bloc consisting of twenty-seven countries, the EU now stands more as an 
independent actor on the world arena. The economies and military capabilities of the 
nations of Europe are no longer in ruin, but that does not mean that they are not 
dependent on the United States anymore. The EU is still not militarily integrated, and 
needs the U.S. as the primary guarantor of security and for exerting leadership in 
NATO. With the growing European independence and power comes a stronger desire to 
state one’s own interests. The fact that the EU has developed into a significant actor in 
the international arena means that Lundestad’s “empire by invitation” does not apply to 
the same extent anymore. Europe prefers the U.S. as an ally and partner, but the 
relationship is to be characterized by equality to a larger extent than before. 
However, even though the invitational aspect is almost gone in Western Europe 
(although not entirely), the reality is different in Eastern Europe. Several Central and 
Eastern European governments are, according to Lundestad, actively inviting the 
Americans in.117 It would appear that these states and their governments are now filling 
the role Western Europe had during the Cold War. Given their history with the Soviet 
Union, it is not difficult to understand why they invite the U.S. These states fear for 
their security from a revitalized Russia which could pose a threat in the future, and the 
only one capable of providing security for them is America.  
The Bush administration on the other hand, sees the danger of promoting a 
strong EU, whose loyalty could not be taken for granted after Iraq. This is when the 
emphasis on “New Europe” instead of “Old Europe” (as Donald Rumsfeld termed it) 
began.118  It would seem that even though the U.S. officially supports European 
integration, the dangers are many, and America could possibly benefit from a division 
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in Europe. As long as invitations from one part of Europe continue, this will have a 
strong impact on the EU and the transatlantic relationship. 
 
4.6.2 “The New Regionalism” 
  Bjørn Hettne’s theory of “the new regionalism” is even more useful after the 
Cold War. Its description of the development of European integration has been well 
documented during the War on Terror. The EU is now much more than it was during 
the Cold War, and the strongest motivations have always come from within Europe. 
This is even truer now than before. As America may show skepticism towards support 
of a unified Europe, the nations of Europe understand the value of integration and how 
far the EU has come in the process of regionalism. 
Geir Lundestad argues that Americans are too impatient, and that they 
underestimate the progress that the EU is making. These critics of regionalism tend to 
point out how slow the process of integration is, and often emphasizes the EU’s failures 
rather than its successes. “The EU has been able to combine geographical widening and 
a deepening of content. European integration has expanded from six to nine to twelve to 
fifteen to twenty-seven members.”119  There is no doubt that the EU has accomplished 
great things, and will continue to do so, even though it will take more time. “the new 
regionalism” is thus more suited than ever to explain the process of integration in 
Europe. In his article, “The Metrosexual Superpower,” Parag Khanna argues how the 
EU is successful in combining its soft and hard power:  
 
Brand Europe is taking over. From environmental sustainability and 
international law to economic development and social welfare, European views 
are more congenial to international tastes and more easily exported than their 
U.S. variants. Even the Bush administration's new strategy toward the “Greater 
Middle East” is based on the Helsinki model, which was Europe's way of 
integrating human rights standards into collective security institutions.120 
 
Khanna also emphasizes how other regional organizations such as ASEAN, 
Mercosure and the African Union are copying the institutional framework of the EU.121 
This certainly applies to Hettnes “new regionalism,” since the emphasis on this theory 
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in addition to initiatives coming from within, is also on how the EU can be a model for 
other regionalist projects to follow. 
However, the EU still has a long way to go in order to fulfill all the aspects of 
“the new regionalism.” It possesses some characteristics of a region-state, but it is still 
unable to coherently act as one single actor in all areas. Again, economically it is a 
regional actor with success, but militarily it lacks signs of success. The division of 
Europe on the Iraq War may disrupt the further integration of Europe and thus the 
explanatory power of this theory, but the battle for a common foreign and defense 
policy is not over yet. The division in Europe over Iraq needs further studies in relation 
to “the new regionalism.”  
After the attacks on the World Trade Center, the U.S. chose to go to war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, because Washington decided that both these states were a threat 
to American security and responsible for the first major attack on American soil since 
the founding of the United States. However, the argument for invading Iraq was to 
remove Saddam Hussein and his alleged weapons of mass destruction. While support in 
Europe for intervention in Afghanistan was wide, the situation was different for the war 
in Iraq. European opposition, and then especially Western European opposition, 
contributed to a negative response to regionalism in Europe. The remarks made by 
former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld confirm this. His emphasis on “New 
Europe,” meaning Eastern Europe, versus “Old Europe,” meaning Western Europe 
shows how the U.S. have tried to influence the development of European integration. 
When the U.S. received support from the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, this not 
only weakened the process of integration and the position of the EU, but it also showed 
the Bush administration that regionalism in Europe did not necessarily promote U.S. 
interests.  
 According to George Blazcya, the emphasis on joining NATO versus joining 
the EU, was important as an emblem for some nations of Eastern Europe. Membership 
in NATO would mean little commitment, but huge benefits in the form of security from 
the only superpower in the world, namely the U.S. The fear of a revitalized Russia once 
again turning its eyes towards its former satellite states was a strong motive for 
supporting America in this region. In addition, Balzyca argues that especially Poland 
had ambitions of its own when supporting the war in Iraq. According to him, Poland 
was hoping for materialistic “rewards” in the reconstruction of Iraq and thus benefiting 
from this economically. There is no doubt that this division inside the EU has weakened 
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the process of European regionalism and that it has created a rift which will take some 
time to close. “….the test for the future will be to figure out what NATO is for and to 
make the enlarged EU work effectively, bridging the gap between those members that 
live under the strong fears of Russia and those where such fears are absent.”122 There is 
no doubt that the EU will enter a turbulent period which will not be easy to manage, the 
success of European regionalism depends on the desire to find order and a new 
commitment to Europe.123 
  
4.6.3 “Defensive Realism” 
  The core concept of Robert Jervis’ notions of “defensive realism” is that states 
expand their influence because they seek security. In addition, the concept that one state 
seeking security may have a negative effect on other states is worth analyzing when 
reviewing American foreign policy during the War on Terror. 
  As mentioned, the U.S. still have strong interests in Europe and have attempted 
to establish closer relations with the nations of Eastern Europe, which have on their part, 
issued invitations to the U.S. If these advances by the Bush administration., namely to 
cooperate with some nations of the EU while ignoring others, can be seen as actions to 
ensure American security, then “defensive realism” still has some importance for the 
period of the War on Terror. More allies are needed in the War on Terror, and especially 
to get things right in Iraq. Moreover, the proposal to establish a missile defense system 
in Poland and the Czech Republic can be seen as actions aimed at preserving American 
security. However, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. claims that this system is for the 
preservation of European security. When one considers the American need for security 
and that the motivation behind any actions of the U.S. usually are in the interests of 
America, it seems likely that this is a part of a larger plan for increasing both the 
influence and security of the U.S. itself. Thus, this action by the Bush administration is 
an example which justifies the core concept of “defensive realism.” 
   Jervis’ notions of elements of a security dilemma and whether a state faces a 
likeminded partner or not, are more difficult to apply. The U.S. does not face another 
superpower which it can geographically and militarily relate to, but a network of 
terrorist residing in multiple countries.  Nor does it engage a state, which makes it 
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difficult to apply many of the aspects of “defensive realism” on how the U.S. handles its 
foreign policy towards the al Qaeda, and how this affects responses to regionalism in 
Europe.  
 
4.6.4 “State-centered Realism” 
  Farheed Zakaria’s theory of “state-centered realism” makes the assumption that 
a state expands when it experiences a growth in power. Furthermore, this theory is 
limited to explaining foreign policy, in addition to focusing on how states see an 
opportunity to expand. That had been a strong critique of the theory, suggesting that it is 
not sufficient to only concentrating on foreign policy without taking into account 
elements of domestic policy which can have an effect on the former. 
  Applying this theory on American foreign policy during the ongoing War on 
Terror reveals a different scenario than that of the Cold War, and it is more difficult to 
apply to this new age. The U.S. is today the world’s only superpower, no other state can 
be said to be able to match it and successfully compete as a rival. In other words, the 
power of the U.S. is at a peak. However, the scene of battle is not in Europe anymore 
and this region’s importance to the U.S. has decreased since the end of the Cold War. 
By using this theory in the same way as “defensive realism,” it is possible to argue that 
it explains American responses to the nations of Eastern Europe. The lack of support 
from Western Europe led to tying a closer relationship to the East, especially since these 
nations pledged their support to an American led invasion of Iraq. The motives of the 
nations in Eastern Europe for their support of the U.S. are discussed more thoroughly 
under section 4.6.2 above. The fact that the U.S. is at a peak when it comes to its power 
increases the probability that it would use its power and influence by ensuring the 
cooperation of these nations. By taking this road of action, the U.S. contributes, as well 
as the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, to the weakening of the EU and 
regionalism in Europe.   
. Thus, this thesis understands the necessity of using both “defensive realism” 
and “state-centered realism” in order to perform a sustainable explanation of American 
foreign policy. However, it is the conclusion of this thesis that these two theories are not 
as sufficient in explaining American responses to European regionalism during the War 
on Terror as they are for analyzing responses during the Cold War. 
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4.6.5 “Hegemony Theory” 
  Volgy and Imwalle’s theory of hegemony and bipolarity during the Cold War 
does not apply during the War on Terror. This theory was based on the principle of 
bipolarity which does not exist as it did during the Cold War. Antonio Gramsci’s theory 
of “cultural hegemony,” however, is important when explaining the relationship 
between America and Europe during the War on Terror. However, its relevance has 
decreased compared to the period of the Cold War. With growing European integration 
comes the weakening of American cultural domination. The U.S. does not fill the role 
as the sole protector of Europe anymore for two reasons. First, the Cold War is over and 
the Soviet Union has seized to exist. Second, Europe has grown in power itself and is 
not in dire need of assistance and protection from America anymore. 
The U.S. cannot be said to be a hegemon which is dominating Europe, the 
integration of the nations of Europe has led to the EU emerging as a more independent 
force capable of stating its own interests in world politics. However, its influence is still 
substantial. For example, in the cultural sphere, the concept of a mass consumption 
culture exists in both Europe and America; its origins can be traced back to the latter. 
This was one of the chief exports during the early years of the Cold War. A clear 
example of this is the strong impact that American movie and TV culture has on 
Europe, and the rest of the world for that matter. The crucial point here is the fact that 
most of Europe watches American movies and TV- shows, and to a certain extent copy 
these and make their own national variants. McDonald’s restaurants are well 
represented throughout European cities. This list can be made longer, but the conclusion 
here is that parts of American culture have melted into European culture and this is in 
accordance with the central aspects of “cultural hegemony.” The U.S. economy is 
closely tied to the economies of the nations of Europe, which is clear as these are 
affected when the American dollar decreases in value. If the U.S. economy would 
collapse, so would the economies of Europe. The impact of the U.S. in political sphere 
is also considerable, something which is very clear when we look at international 
politics and the UN. Without the support of the U.S., organizations like the UN and the 
EU find it difficult to make decisions and execute them. In addition, the U.S. has much 
influence over NATO and its members. To conclude, the U.S. is no longer a hegemon 
dominating Europe, but it still possesses a large degree of influence. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
  
This chapter discusses how the relationship between America and Europe once 
again has been put to a test by disagreement over the war in Iraq. In addition to 
transatlantic relations worsening, the growing division inside Europe itself is also a 
consequence of American foreign policy in the Middle East. An important part of this 
chapter is applying the theories of chapter two on the realities of the War on Terror. 
  The Bush administration continued the American tradition of supporting 
regionalism in Europe when it came into office, even though there was some skepticism 
of a united and enlarged EU becoming too independent and influential in the 
international arena. Signs of unilateralism in American foreign policy did worry the 
nations of Europe, who feared that the U.S. would isolate itself from the rest of the 
world once more. 
  The attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, put a halt to 
problems in transatlantic relations. All of Europe sympathized with the U.S. and offered 
its support to the superpower when it launched an attack on Afghanistan and the 
terrorist organization known as the al Qaeda. However, it became clear that the U.S. 
wanted to have exclusive control over the campaign and was not interested in involving 
NATO or the UN until later when the war was over. 
  The war in Iraq seriously damaged transatlantic relations, and had a negative 
impact on America’s response to European regionalism as well as the process of 
regionalism in Europe. First, the opposition from some of the nations in the EU to 
American hostility towards Iraq contributed to cooling down the relationship between 
the two. Second, the EU was divided into those who opposed the Iraq War and those 
who supported the U.S. intervention. This division of Europe had a negative effect on 
European regionalism in the sense that EU was not able to speak with one voice. Thus, 
this weakened the process of European integration further, both by the fact that some 
nations chose to support the U.S., but also by how America embraced the responses by 
these nations. Rumsfeld’s remarks of “Old Europe” and “New Europe” cooled down 
transatlantic relations once again. The issues regarding a missile defensive system in 
Eastern Europe is also worsening transatlantic relations. The U.S. is focusing on 
“special relationships” with individual states instead of dealing with the EU. 
  The role of NATO has changed much since the Cold War days. Its importance 
to the U.S. has decreased and is regarded more as a “tool box” to be used by America 
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than a collective security organization. On the other hand, the concern that the EU 
would rise as an independent military power has prompted the U.S. to encourage 
military integration under NATO in Europe. This way, America has more control over 
developments in Europe. The issue of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe also 
weakens the position and role of NATO, as the U.S. prefers not to involve the 
organization but instead focus on “coalitions of the willing.” 
  Geir Lundestad’s “empire by invitation” theory is still relevant during the War 
on Terror period. Even though invitations from Western Europe have more or less 
ended, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are pledging their support to the U.S. 
These nations see America as their protector, and will not do anything to compromise 
that relationship and thus their own security. In Eastern Europe there is some concern 
that Russia might one day be revitalized and again seek to exert its influence. This 
underlines the importance of having a good relationship with the U.S.  
“The new regionalism” as described by Bjørn Hettne can be said to be more 
important than ever. In a period where the EU is evolving more and more on many 
levels and the motvation still comes strongly from within, it has started to find its place 
in the international arena. Granted, the EU still has a long way to go, especially when it 
comes to forming a unified foreign policy, a common constitution and military 
integration, but the development since the Cold War has been astonishing.  
The notions of “defensive realism” as presented by Robert Jervis also have some 
relevance during the War on Terror. When facing opposition from most of the Western 
part of the EU, the U.S. tries to establish closer relations with Central and Eastern 
European states. By doing this the U.S. indirectly contributes to the weakening of the 
process of European regionalism, but in this context this serves the interest of America, 
which gains support for its policy towards Iraq. The reason for waging a war in Iraq is 
first and foremost motivated by the American pursuit for security. However, this thesis 
admits that his theory is not especially suitable for explaining the American response to 
European integration when concerning the War on Terror. 
Farheed Zakaria’s theory “state-centered realism” has elements which can apply 
to how the U.S. responds to regionalism in Europe during the War on Terror, but like 
“defensive realism,” its relevance has decreased compared to the Cold War. After the 
end of the Cold War the U.S. stood alone as the world’s only superpower after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S. was, and is, the most powerful military force in 
the world. It is possible to view the American support of Central and Eastern Europe as 
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“New Europe” as a way of once more establishing more influence in the region by 
disrupting the process of regionalism in Europe.  
Volgy and Imwalle’s article of hegemony and bipolarity has no relevance during 
the War on Terror because the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union has seized to 
exist. Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “cultural hegemony” is still relevant during the War 
on Terror. However, America is not a hegemon which dominates Europe anymore, the 
integration of European nations can be said to have prevented this. With growing 
regionalism in Europe, where the EU develops into a “region-state,” the possibility of 
an American hegemony decreases. However, Gramsci’s theory can still be applied to 
the aspect of a mass consumption culture, something which both Europe and America 
shares. This culture, which was exported from the U.S. during the early years of the 
Cold War, represents the enormous impact of American way of life on Europe. In 
addition, the impact of the U.S. in the political and economic sphere is still 
considerable. Especially important is the influence the U.S. has over NATO. To 
conclude; instead of being able to dominate Europe as a hegemon, the U.S. has at this 
time a strong influence of the nations of Europe. The further development of European 
regionalism may contribute to decrease this influence in the future.  
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has made an analysis of the relationship between the United States 
and Europe, more specifically; the emphasis has been on America’s responses to 
European Regionalism. The analysis has compared two different time periods 
concerning American responses to European integration and these are the Cold War and 
the current War on Terror. The main goal of this thesis has been to establish whether 
there is a pattern to be found when looking at U.S. responses during these two periods. 
 
5.2 Theories 
   
The theories used in thesis seem to have stronger explanatory powers when it 
comes to analyzing American responses to regionalism in Europe during the Cold 
War. The exception is Bjørn Hettne’s theory of “the new regionalism,” which is more 
effective in the analysis of the War on Terror. 
  Geir Lundestad’s theory of “empire by invitation” is invaluable when it comes 
to analyzing both American and European responses during the Cold War. This theory 
explains how Western Europe welcomed American leadership, and how this contributed 
to the U.S. achieving important foreign policy goals in the fight against Communism. 
However, even though the U.S. did obtain many of its goals by promoting European 
integration, the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic were not always that 
harmonic. In the period from 1969 to 1977, the U.S. was weakened by the Vietnam War 
and Western Europe was starting to move towards greater independence and demanding 
more influence. Despite the fact that Europe was moving towards a more independent 
role, the fact remained that the invitation for the presence of American troops in Europe 
endured. As a matter of fact, it was almost a demand. Europe still needed the security 
guarantee which only the U.S. could provide. 
  “Empire by invitation” does not on the other hand, have as much relevance 
during the War on Terror as it had when dealing with the Cold War. Invitations from 
Western Europe have more or less stopped completely since the EU has now evolved 
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into much more than a “fellowship” of European countries. However, invitations have 
started to come from several nations in Central and Eastern Europe. Especially the states 
in the east are concerned about losing the American security guarantee. The support 
from these nations to the war in Iraq is more complex than it would seem. Motivation to 
support the U.S. has to with security. America presents a guarantee against a Russia 
which may be revitalized in the future. Some countries, however, have other reasons for 
participating in the campaign. Poland, as one example, has achieved materialistic gains 
from supporting of the U.S. 
  Bjørn Hettnes’s theory of “the new regionalism” is as mentioned, not supposed 
to apply to the period of the Cold War. This thesis argues however, that the seeds which 
were sown concerning European integration during this period can only be explained by 
using Hettne’s theory. The emphasis of “new regionalism” on how initiatives started to 
come from within is clear when we look at the developments in the period from 1969 to 
1977. With the inclusion of Great Britain in the EC, the focus of Western Europe moved 
towards integration instead of “special relationships” with the U.S. Thus, regionalism in 
Europe began to serve the interests of the nations of Western Europe more than those of 
the U.S. 
  “The new regionalism” and its relevance to the period of the War on Terror is 
an important part of this thesis. The EU now has twenty-seven members and the 
integration process has made major developments since the Cold War. Its economic 
power is considerable, and also, to a certain extent, its political power deserves 
attention. The initiatives and control over the process are mostly coming from within 
Europe; the U.S. is not supervising or influencing integration to the same extent 
anymore. In addition, the EU has now become an example for other regionalist projects 
to base their institutional founding on. Examples of these are ASEAN, Mercosure and 
the African Union.  
  Robert Jervis’ notions of “defensive realism” also contribute to explaining 
American responses to regionalism in Europe. “Defensive realism” and its emphasis on 
how states expand due to security reasons are well suited for the realities of the Cold 
War. This thesis concludes that the U.S. expanded its influence in Europe by promoting 
integration in the region for security reasons. A strengthened and integrated Europe 
posed an effective deterrent against Communist expansion, which was in the interest of 
America. 
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  The importance of “defensive realism” seems to have been decreased when 
applying Jervis’ notions to the realities of the War on Terror. Europe is not that closely 
tied with American security anymore, even though the U.S. still have strong interests in 
the region. The U.S. is currently struggling with the situation in Iraq, and has since the 
beginning of the War on Terror faced opposition from most parts of Western Europe. 
However, the nations of Central and especially those of Eastern Europe continue to 
make efforts to have good relations with the U.S. The support of these nations can be 
seen as important to American security. Moreover, the proposal to establish missile 
shields in Poland and the Czech Republic suggests that American security is still 
connected to Europe, even though its interests and influence have now moved more to 
the East. 
  Fareed Zakaria’s theory of “state-centered realism” is also possible to use as an 
explanation of how the U.S. responded to integration in Europe. When reviewing the 
role which the U.S. possessed after World War II, it makes sense to apply this theory. 
America had experienced a growth in power compared to everyone else, and expanded 
its influence in Europe because it could, by promoting regionalism. However, this thesis 
concentrates on a specific period during the Cold War, namely the years from 1969 to 
1977 where the U.S. had been weakened by the war in Vietnam. By experiencing this 
weakness the U.S. tried to encourage “special relationships” with Britain and France, 
who were at this point more interested in the process of European integration. To 
conclude then, “state-centered realism” has some usefulness in explaining American 
responses to regionalism in Europe during this period of the Cold War. 
  “State-centered realism” seems to have lost most of its importance when 
reviewing the War on Terror. Once again, the U.S. appears to be at a peak when it 
comes to power, and it is the only superpower in the world. However, it has not been 
influencing Europe in the same way as it did during the early period of the Cold War. 
With the EU emerging as a significant actor in its own, Zakaria’s theory of how states 
expand because they can, does not apply to the U.S. and its response to regionalism in 
Europe during the War on Terror. In this context, “defensive realism,” an object for 
criticism by Zakaria, is more suited to explain American responses and actions toward 
Europe. It is more useful for this thesis to argue that security reasons, rather than 
expansion only because one can, due to increased power, are creating the American 
responses towards regionalism in Europe. 
 72 
  The impact of hegemony on the relationship between Europe and America 
during the Cold War, as described by Volgy and Imwalle, is substantial. When 
following their argument it becomes clear that the U.S., as the hegemon, presided over 
Europe and had the strength and ability to prevent Communism from disrupting its 
hegemony during the Cold War. Thus, this helps to explain how America became a 
hegemon when encouraging and supporting regionalism in Europe. Moreover, the 
concept of cultural domination is important in this context. As originally presented by 
Antonio Gramsci, this idea focuses on how the hegemon relies on values instead of 
power as means of “ruling.” America’s cultural impact on Western Europe was strong, 
perhaps strongest in the early face of the Cold War. The export of American movies, 
clothing, literature, music and food heavily influenced Western Europe. America had 
the economic and military power to set the rules of the game after being invited by the 
Europeans. Europe, in exchange for receiving economic and military aid, had to 
embrace the American system of liberal values in economy and politics. In addition, 
Gramsci’s ideas concerning how the hegemon needs to make sacrifices in order to 
achieve and sustain its hegemony, are important when considering the Cold War. 
America did sacrifice certain economic interests, but his was necessary for the further 
development of the integration of Europe. 
  Volgy and Imwalle’s theory of hegemony and bipolarity during the Cold War 
does not apply during the War on Terror. Firstly, the Cold War is over and the U.S. is 
the only superpower left in the World after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, 
the U.S. can not be seen as a hegemon presiding over Europe and setting the rules 
anymore as the EU has evolved up to much higher level than before. However, Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory of “cultural hegemony” has much significance even during the War on 
Terror. Even though American culture and values tend to differ, there are also many 
similarities. The export of a mass-consumer culture still prevails in Europe today, a 
culture which came from the U.S. In addition, American music and movies still have a 
strong impact on the cultures of Europe. This thesis does not conclude, however, that 
Europe is without such a culture itself, but only that the impact of American culture in 
these areas are still significant and thus strengthens the theory of “cultural hegemony.” 
Furthermore, the U.S. is no longer a dominating hegemon, but resembles more a 
hegemon with strong influence over Europe. This is clear when we look at how the 
American economy greatly affects the economies of the nations of Europe, but also how 
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the U.S. influences Europe politically in international forums such as the UN and other 
international organizations. 
   
5.3 The Cold War and the War on Terror 
5.3.1 The Cold War 
The American response to regionalism varied greatly during the years of the 
Cold War. This theoretical analysis of this thesis has concentrated on a specific period 
during the Cold War, namely the years from 1969 to 1977. During this period the U.S. 
was, as mentioned, weakened by the war in Vietnam. Its responses to regionalism in 
Europe were to try and establish “special relationships” with France and Great Britain in 
order to slow down the integration process. The reason for this was the growing fear of 
Europe becoming too strong and independent while the power and influence of the U.S. 
had decreased. From being initially positive to European integration, the U.S. had 
moved to a more skeptical view of regionalism in Europe. Especially the Nixon 
administration took steps to tone down its promotion of the integration process. On the 
other hand, both sides realized their dependency on each other. Even though Europe 
was becoming stronger, the need for American troops to stay in Europe remained. The 
fact that the nations of Western Europe had begun to establish their own policies 
towards the Soviet Union did not mean that they were ready to lose the American 
security guarantee. The U.S. certainly needed Europe in the sense that the region 
functioned as a deterrent against Communism. 
  When considering the different responses by U.S. administrations to 
regionalism in Europe, there are clear patterns to detect. It would seem that whenever 
European integration was in the interest of the U.S., it was strongly promoted. The 
many goals perceived by different American administrations weighed heavily on the 
decisions which were made. Western Europe functioning as a deterrent against 
Communism was one issue. However, the need for the nations of Europe to begin to 
finance a part of their own defense was also an important goal for the U.S. European 
security did not come cheap. The U.S. also had the ambition of huge benefits from the 
European market, something which did not exactly go as planned due to European 
protectionism.  
Both the idea and the concern of Europe as a “third force” is a continuing pattern 
with several U.S. administrations regarding the response to regionalism in Europe. It is 
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especially the concern of Europe becoming too powerful and then turning against the 
U.S. which led to the cooling down of the promotion of European integration. As 
European integration progressed, so did the concern that Europe might break away and 
oppose the U.S. For the Nixon administration it was important to make sure that Europe 
understood that its responsibilities were regional, while the U.S. had global 
responsibilities. Europe was mot supposed to be a “third force” in the sense of a 
competitor who could challenge the U.S. The American view implied the EU as a 
regional actor that functioned as a partner and ally, although one that knew its place. 
Other patterns when considering American responses are the idea of European 
integration as a deterrent against Communism. No administration contested the 
importance this. Another important pattern was the concern regarding the economic cost 
of defending Europe, and how integration would enable Europe to start pulling some of 
its own weight. 
 
5.3.2 The Role of NATO during the Cold War 
 Following the founding of NATO after World War II most European nations 
agreed that the American commitment to NATO should be as deep as possible. The role 
of NATO as a defense against Communist expansion was as important for Europe as it 
was for the U.S. The process of integration in Europe was under the influence of the 
U.S., and this was also the case for NATO. It would appear that the American emphasis 
on NATO would suggest that the U.S. preferred this development instead of a united 
Europe playing a stronger military role. Seeing as the nations of Europe welcomed 
American leadership in NATO, the U.S. was given an opportunity to influence the 
process of integration in Europe as well as the development of NATO during the Cold 
War. In the period of the Cold War, NATO was an efficient organization for a defense 
against an expanding Soviet Union. 
 
5.3.3 The War on Terror 
  When George W. Bush took the oath as president of the U.S., politicians all 
over Europe did not know what to make of him and how Euro-US relations would be in 
the future. Even though the Bush administration did not pay too much attention to 
relations with foreign countries in the beginning, it resumed the policy of supporting 
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integration in Europe, despite some skepticism about the role of the EU in international 
politics. In Europe, there were concerns about the growing signs of American 
unilateralism and isolationism. 
  The war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq stand as two very clear contrasts 
regarding transatlantic relations. The first war was characterized by an overwhelming 
support to a U.S. in grief over terrorist attacks which sought retribution towards the al 
Qaeda, while the second war cooled down relations between the two sides of the 
Atlantic. Furthermore, it also contributed to a division among the members of the EU.  
The opposition that the U.S. faced from parts of Europe made the Bush 
administration less positive to integration in Europe, and more concerned with “special 
relationships.” The emphasis on “Old Europe” versus “New Europe” not only worsened 
relations between Western Europe and the U.S., but it also had a negative impact on the 
integration process and the position of the EU. It became clear that the EU was not able 
to speak with one voice regarding international issues. The most recent issue concerning 
American policies towards Eastern Europe is the deployment of a missile defense 
system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The argument from the US government is 
that this will offer protection from a possible missile attack from Iran. Furthermore, 
Washington claims that the security of Europe is the important issue in this context. 
However, it seems likely that the security of the U.S. is the primary goal behind this 
action. The security of Europe has only been important in the past when it has been 
linked with the security of the U.S. It does not appear to be probable that this has 
changed during the War on Terror.  
Despite the fact that the Bush administration showed an interest in cooperation 
with NATO and the EU after the reelection in 2005, it would seem that the U.S. has not 
been, and is not interested in, this kind of cooperation if it does not correspond with 
American interests. The emphasis on “special relationships” once again would suggest 
that the U.S. is using the old strategy of “divide and conquer” by forming close 
relationships with some nations in the EU and thus weakening the process of integration 
and the position of the EU. 
 
5.3.4 The Role of NATO during the War on Terror  
In its first term, the Bush administration was prepared to cooperate more with 
the EU. NATO seemed to be a most effective instrument for the U.S. to influence the 
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development in Europe. American promoted the expansion of NATO because it 
believed that this meant strengthening the role of the U.S. in Europe. After the attack on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, NATO invoked its article 5 for the first time 
ever, showing that the U.S. had the support of the organization and the nations of 
Europe. The situation changed when plans to invade Iraq were presented. Europe was 
concerned that the U.S. did not perceive its NATO allies as especially important any 
more. The Bush administration preferred ad hoc coalitions instead of relying on NATO 
and this revealed that the importance of NATO for the U.S. had decreased. On the other 
hand, the administration still stressed the importance of NATO functioning as the most 
important security organization in Europe. This suggests that the concern that the 
European Union will become stronger and more influential militarily is present in the 
Bush administration, as well as it has been in previous U.S. governments.  
 
5.3.5 The Patterns and the Future of EU-US Relations 
The two periods which are discussed in this thesis do have a lot in common 
when regarding American responses to regionalism in Europe. During both the Cold 
War and the War on Terror it becomes clear that the U.S. supports regionalism in 
Europe as long as it serves American interests. 
The importance of European integration as a deterrent against Communist 
expansion during the Cold War cannot be underestimated. In addition, the American 
goal of making Europe strong enough to start paying for its own defense was a strong 
motive for supporting regionalism in the region. However, in the period from 1969 to 
1977 when the U.S. was weakened, it is possible to see how support for integration 
decreased as the U.S. tried to establish “special relationships” instead. 
During the War on Terror we can see the same pattern concerning the war in 
Iraq and its aftermath. The opposition from parts of the EU encouraged the U.S. to once 
again establish “special relationships.” Countries from Eastern and Central Europe were 
more sympathetic to the policies of the Bush administration, and this led to this 
administration’s emphasis on individual agreements with these states. The latest 
example of this is the plans for deploying a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, 
more specifically in Poland and the Czech Republic. When the U.S. “bypasses” the EU 
and NATO in making the decision to place missiles and radars in Europe, it also 
undermines the process of European integration. According to the Norwegian Foreign 
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Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, there is not a consensus in NATO for the execution of these 
plans. The official statement from the secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is that 
“All allies agree a threat from ballistic missiles exist.”124 This is again an example of 
how the Bush administration appears to be dividing the EU and NATO by undermining 
their authority. At the present time, the issue is being debated at an informal NATO 
meeting in Oslo. To repeat the point of the argument in this thesis; the pattern which 
emerges from all of the responses by the U.S. to European regionalism is that they will 
vary according to their relevance to U.S. interests. This seems very clear when 
reviewing the foreign policy of the current administration, but it is not a new 
phenomenon. 
The concern of Europe developing into a “third force” is present in almost every 
administration during the Cold War and the War on Terror. It would seem that the U.S. 
favors regionalism in Europe as long as its independence does not contradict with 
American interests. The concern with Europe and the EU as a “third force” appears to 
be growing along with the development of European integration. The Bush 
administration still stresses that the military integration of Europe should develop within 
the Atlantic framework, allowing the U.S. to have influence over the process and thus 
preventing the EU from emerging as a military counterweight. 
In the introductory chapter to this thesis, the author posed the following 
question: “Seeing the world through a realist lens, can the EU in the future fill the role 
as a superpower and a counterweight to the U.S., and in this context, what are the 
American responses to this hypothetic reality?” The French view has long been that the 
EU would perform some sort of balance against the U.S. Geir Lundestad argues that this 
view must be abandoned, but he also believes that the EU should not “consistently 
follow the U.S. lead.”125 Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras also argue that individuals 
in Europe claim that the EU must speed up the process of military integration in order to 
establish a power balance to the U.S. The author of this thesis agrees with their 
conclusion that: “If…they attempt to become a U.S. in the place of the U.S., then this 
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 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO united on missile defence approach”, 19 April 2007, 
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effort will not succeed.”126 There are two reasons for this: “Firstly, the U.S. knows 
better than anyone how to be itself, and secondly, in such a situation, the EU risks 
losing all the advantages it enjoys and which make it so successful in the current world, 
capable of attracting scores of other countries.”127 It is uncertain what will become of 
the role of the EU in international politics, but it is likely that the U.S. will probably not 
respond positively to a more powerful and integrated Europe if it does not correspond 
with its interests. The problems in transatlantic relations will not disappear in the near 
future. 
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